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THROWING THE RED FLAG ON THE
COMMISSIONER: HOW INDEPENDENT
ARBITRATORS CAN FIT INTO THE NFL’S OFFFIELD DISCIPLINE PROCEDURES UNDER THE
NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that Player A, a popular player in the National Football
League (―NFL‖) is allegedly involved in defrauding several charitable
organizations of which he is a board member.1 Player A is arrested and
indicted on various federal criminal charges. At first, Player A is
reluctant to provide federal authorities with personal and organizational
financial documents because he is in complete disbelief of the
allegations. Upon compliance with the requests and discussion with
authorities, it comes to light that Player A‘s fellow board member in the
charity acted alone in the criminal activity. However, because Player A
was initially reluctant to cooperate and may not have been duly diligent
in running the organization, Player A pleads to an obstruction of justice
charge. Player A serves no jail time and agrees to reimburse a major
portion of the defrauded money.
NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell has been monitoring the situation
and is disappointed that Player A was involved in the allegations,
especially during a time in which the national economy was
experiencing a recession. The public is not aware of the details
surrounding the plea agreement and Player A‘s actual level of
involvement in defrauding the charitable organizations. Consequently,
the public‘s perception of Player A and the NFL has been negative
throughout. Goodell decides to suspend Player A for the remaining six
games of the season, costing him nearly $1 million in game checks, for
detrimental conduct that violates the Personal Conduct Policy.2 Goodell
imposes a severe punishment to prevent further distraction, to show that
the NFL does not support such criminal conduct, and to send a message
to other players that they must be in complete control of any charitable
organizations with which they are involved.

This fact pattern is a hypothetical created by the author.
See Personal Conduct Policy, NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 1–2 (2008), available at
http://images.nflplayers.com/mediaResources/images/oldImages/fck/NFL%20Personal
%20Conduct%20Policy%202008.pdf (stating that NFL players must avoid ―conduct
detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in the National Football League‖).

1
2
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Player A‘s only hope of reducing the punishment imposed under the
Policy would be to appeal back to Goodell.3 He could not use the
independent arbitration process that has been successfully used by
National Basketball Association (―NBA‖) and Major League Baseball
(―MLB‖) players because the NFL policy does not allow for a similar
procedure.4 Further, Player A would not have defined discovery
guidelines or standards of review for procedural protection. Thus, if
Player A appeals to Goodell, his chances of a reduced suspension are
minimal.5
The NFL Personal Conduct Policy authorizes the NFL Commissioner
to ―impose discipline as warranted‖ whenever a player acts in a way that
does not meet the high standards of NFL players.6 The Commissioner
can punish a player for conduct that he determines to be merely
irresponsible even if it is not illegal.7 NFL players are judged at the
Commissioner‘s discretion and cannot appeal punishments to an
independent body.8 The Commissioner is the only person authorized to
review the reasonableness of his decision under the Policy.9 Thus, an
3
See infra Part II.B.1.d (discussing the appeal process available to players under the
Personal Conduct Policy).
4
See infra Part II.B.2–3 (providing examples of how both the NBA and MLB have used
independent arbitrators).
5
See, e.g., Associated Press, NFL Upholds Three-game Suspension for Bills RB Lynch, NFL
(Aug. 3, 2009, 7:39 PM), http://www.nfl.com/trainingcamp/story/09000d5d811
a221a/article/nfl-upholds-threegame-suspension-for-bills-rb-lynch
(explaining
that
Commissioner Goodell upheld the suspension of NFL player Marshawn Lynch for
pleading guilty to a misdemeanor gun charge); Pacman‘s 1-Year Suspension Upheld,
ABCNEWS (Nov. 7, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/story?id=3832139&page=1
(discussing Commissioner Goodell‘s decision to uphold the suspension of Adam Jones for
the accumulation of various instances of detrimental conduct); Jones Drops Appeal of Oneyear NFL Suspension, ESPN (June 13, 2007, 2:14 AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/
story?id=2901842 (stating that Adam Jones dropped his appeal to Commissioner Goodell
and that Commissioner Goodell suspended Tank Johnson and Chris Henry each for eight
games).
6
Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 2, at 2. ―All persons associated with the NFL are
required to avoid ‗conduct detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in the
National Football League.‘‖ Id. at 1.
7
Id. at 1–2. ―[A]n employee of the NFL or a member club [is] held to a higher standard
and expected to conduct [himself] in a way that is responsible, promotes the values upon
which the League is based, and is lawful.‖ Id. Persons who violate any part of this
standard are still subject to discipline because ―[i]t is not enough simply to avoid being
found guilty of a crime.‖ Id.
8
See id. at 3. All appellate hearings are held ―pursuant to Article XI of the [NFL]
Collective Bargaining Agreement.‖ Id.
9
See Commissioner Discipline, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2006–2012, 34,
available at http://images.nflplayers.com/mediaResources/files/PDFs/General/NFL%20
COLLECTIVE%20BARGAINING%20AGREEMENT%202006%20-%202012.pdf (last visited
Aug. 15, 2010) (explaining that all appeals will be made to the commissioner and that all
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NFL player has no way of reversing the Commissioner‘s decision if it is
excessive or arbitrary. The NFL Players Association (―NFLPA‖) cannot
provide any relief because it did not play a role in the Policy‘s
implementation.10 This problem is unique to professional sports because
it gives the owners and commissioners power to prevent an employee‘s
access to an entire industry.11 Furthermore, the agreements between the
employers and employees are governed not just by contract law but by
labor laws.12
The appeal rights of players should be increased in order to limit
Goodell‘s nearly unchecked authority under the current disciplinary
structure in the NFL. When Goodell imposes discipline, the Policy takes
precedence and vacates other independent appeal rights.13 This ignores
the successful use of arbitration in the NBA and MLB, federal and state
policies supporting arbitration, and the proper procedural protections
recommended by courts and legislatures for appellate review
processes.14 With the expiration of the NFL Collective Bargaining
Agreement (―CBA‖) at the end of the 2010 league year, the NFLPA
should negotiate for an improved Personal Conduct Policy that provides
players proper appeal rights.15
The purpose of this Note is to advocate that the Personal Conduct
Policy should become a part of a new collective bargaining agreement
and that it should include an independent arbitration process in order to
preserve players‘ appeal rights when punished for off-field conduct.
Part II begins with an overview of arbitration and the judicial and

decisions will be complete and final). The commissioner may choose his own designee to
review punishments. Id.
10
See infra Part II.B.1.d (discussing the creation of the Personal Conduct Policy).
11
See infra note 250 and accompanying text (explaining the unique authority of
commissioners in professional sports).
12
See infra note 45 (discussing collective bargaining agreements under the rules of labor
law).
13
See infra Part II.B.1.c (explaining that when the commissioner imposes discipline, any
dispute arising from that discipline will be heard by the commissioner alone).
14
See infra Part II.B.2–3 (discussing the grievance procedures utilized in the NBA and
MLB); infra Part II.A (discussing the development of the use of arbitration through judicial
and legislative support); infra Part III.D–E (analyzing the need for impartiality, standards of
review, and reasonably defined procedures in appellate review).
15
See Goodell‘s Authority to be Part of Talks, ESPN (July 28, 2009, 12:46 PM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=4360661 (discussing the plans to evaluate
the commissioner‘s authority during negotiations for a new CBA); NFL Owners Opt Out of
CBA, NFL, http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d5d80868b78&template=withoutvideo&confirm=true (last visited Aug. 31, 2010) (explaining that the owners voted
unanimously to exercise the option to shorten the current agreement by two years and to
begin negotiations for a new agreement).
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legislative interpretation of awards.16 It concludes by examining the
current disciplinary structure in the NFL as well as in the NBA and
MLB.17 Part III analyzes the NFL commissioner‘s role as a final judge
under current arbitration laws18 and how unilateral implementation of
the Policy gives the commissioner such broad authority. 19 It also
examines the ―best interests‖ authority of each league‘s commissioner 20
and compares the standards of review and the appeal procedures used
in the NFL, NBA, and MLB.21 Part IV proposes that the Policy be
amended and incorporated into a new NFL collective bargaining
agreement to limit the commissioner‘s disciplinary authority and expand
players‘ appeal rights.22
II. BACKGROUND
There have been numerous instances of improper off-field conduct
by NFL players since Roger Goodell was named Commissioner. 23 In
See infra Part II.A (discussing how the use of arbitration gained support through the
courts and legislation).
17
See infra Part II.B (discussing the governing documents of the NFL, NBA, and MLB, as
well as the disciplinary authority of each league commissioner).
18
See infra Part III.A (discussing the role of the NFL commissioner in the context of
arbitration principles).
19
See infra Part III.B (analyzing the creation of the Personal Conduct Policy as a working
condition).
20
See infra Part III.C (analyzing the best interests authority of commissioners in
professional sports).
21
See infra Part III.D–E (comparing and analyzing the different procedural protections
and standards of review used in the appellate procedures in professional sports).
22
See infra Part IV (explaining how the Personal Conduct Policy should be incorporated
into the new CBA).
23
Peter King, Goodell‘s the Guy: Owners Tab Chief Operating Officer as NFL Commish,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 9, 2006, 6:56 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2006/
writers/peter_king/08/08/commish.elected/index.html. Roger Goodell was elected by
the owners to succeed Paul Tagliabue as the eighth commissioner of the NFL following
twenty-four years of working in the League. Id.; see also Michael Vick Timeline, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Aug. 13, 2009, 9:48 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=4398110
(―NFL commissioner Roger Goodell suspends Vick indefinitely without pay from the
NFL.‖). Michael Vick pled guilty to federal dog fighting conspiracy charges and was in
federal custody from November 2007 to July 2009. Id.; see also Timeline of Trouble for Pacman
Jones, ESPN (Jan. 8, 2009), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/otl/news/story?id=3823894
(―While Jones awaits formal charges from the Las Vegas incident, commissioner Roger
Goodell suspends him for the 2007 season, telling him in a written statement: ‗I must
emphasize to you that this is your last opportunity to salvage your NFL career.‘‖).
Following a suspension for the entire 2007 season, Pacman Jones continued to have various
run-ins with the law that led to yet another suspension for six games in the 2008 season.
Id.; see also Burress Pleads Guilty on Felony Charge, ESPN (Aug. 21, 2009, 11:55 AM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=4411373 (explaining that Plaxico Burress
was sentenced to two years in prison after pleading guilty to the attempted criminal
16
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response to these events, Goodell has exercised his authority under the
NFL‘s governing documents and has disciplined players.24 Goodell‘s
disciplinary decisions have raised concern among players and the
NFLPA.25 The concerns center on the strict punishments that Goodell
imposes under the broad disciplinary authority granted to him by a
Personal Conduct Policy that was implemented without negotiation.26
Other professional sports leagues use arbitration to resolve disputes
to remedy some of the concerns analogous to those being voiced in
regard to Commissioner Goodell‘s recent disciplinary rulings. 27
Currently, the NFL does not allow independent review of rulings under

possession of a weapon). Goodell suspended Burress for the duration of his incarceration
and said that he would be able to sign with a team upon completion of his prison term. Id.;
see also Judy Battista, Stallworth Suspended for Entire N.F.L. Season, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/14/sports/football/14stallworth.html (―‗You are
clearly guilty of conduct detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in the N.F.L.,‘
Goodell wrote in a letter to Stallworth. ‗Legal arguments that focus on criminal liability
under Florida law do not diminish that damage or your responsibility for your conduct.‘‖).
Goodell suspended Donté Stallworth for the 2009 season after Stallworth pled guilty to
DUI manslaughter following an incident in which he, while driving drunk, struck and
killed a pedestrian. Id.
24
See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the governing documents of the NFL, which include
the Personal Conduct Policy, the CBA, the NFL Constitution and By-laws, and the Uniform
Player Contract).
25
Goodell‘s Authority, supra note 15; see also Dan Le Batard, NFL Commissioner Roger
Goodell‘s
Methods
Not
Working,
MIAMI
HERALD,
Aug.
23,
2009,
http://www.miamiherald.com/sports/columnists/dan-le-batard/story/1198456.html (on
file with author) (suggesting that the disciplinary actions taken by Commissioner Goodell
have not worked to reduce detrimental behavior by players).
26
See Goodell‘s Authority, supra note 15 (explaining that Goodell‘s disciplinary decisions
since taking over as commissioner have caused the NFLPA and its new leader, DeMaurice
Smith, as well as the players, to question the breadth of the commissioner‘s authority to
discipline players); see also Goodell Strengthens NFL Personal Conduct Policy, USA TODAY,
Apr. 11, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2007-04-10-new-conductpolicy_N.htm (explaining that under the new conduct policy, players as well as teams that
violate the policy will receive longer suspensions and larger fines); infra Part III.B
(discussing the lack of negotiation prior to the implementation of the Policy as a working
condition).
27
See, e.g., 2007–2011 Basic Agreement, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION,
38–39, available at http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf (last visited Sept.
24, 2009) [hereinafter MLB Basic Agreement] (stating that a grievance filed in response to a
disciplinary decision could ultimately end up in arbitration); see also Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n
v. Nat‘l Basketball Players Ass‘n, No. 04 Civ. 9528(GBD), 2005 WL 22869 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3,
2005) (affirming a grievance arbitrator‘s reduction of a suspension determined by the
commissioner); In re Nat‘l Basketball Players Ass‘n ex rel Player Latrell Sprewell & Warriors
Basketball Club & Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n, 591 PLI/Pat (Pub. L. Inst.) 469 (2000) (Feerick,
Arb.) (holding that because the commissioner‘s suspension of player Latrell Sprewell was
not in the interest of fairness and justice, the arbitrator was correct in reducing it).
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the Personal Conduct Policy.28 With the expiration of the NFL CBA at
the end of the 2010 season, NFLPA leader DeMaurice Smith will have
the opportunity to negotiate for impartial arbitration akin to what the
NBA and MLB allow.29
Part II.A of this Note will explore increased legislative and judicial
support for the use of arbitration. 30 It will also present the grounds for
vacating or modifying an arbitration award.31 Part II.B will examine the
current governing documents that form the disciplinary structure in
professional sports leagues beginning with the NFL and concluding with
the NBA and MLB.32
A. The Development of Arbitration
Arbitration is used in place of litigation as an alternative method of
dispute resolution.33 Generally, two parties use it as the final step in a
grievance procedure that is often through a collective bargaining
agreement.34 Though there are several methods of arbitration, for the
28
See infra Part II.B.1.d (explaining the appeals process for disciplinary decisions under
the Policy).
29
Goodell‘s Authority, supra note 15; see NFL Owners Opt Out of CBA, supra note 15
(stating that the current agreement has been shortened and will expire at the end of the
2010 season).
30
See infra Part II.A (discussing arbitration and its application in labor situations).
31
See infra Part II.A.3 (stating the statutory and common law grounds for invalidating an
arbitration award).
32
See infra Part II.B (discussing the discipline in the governing documents of the NFL,
NBA, and MLB).
33
Collective Bargaining, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://topics.law.cornell.edu/wex/
collective_bargaining (last visited Aug. 15, 2010); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (stating that in contracting to arbitrate a claim, the parties are
agreeing to forgo the use of a judicial forum to resolve the issue); Mark Berger, Arbitration
and Arbitrability: Toward an Expectation Model, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 753, 756 (2004) [hereinafter
Berger, Arbitrability] (explaining that the Supreme Court has made it clear that arbitration is
―simply the substitution of one decision making forum for another.‖); see also United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960) (explaining that
arbitration is a substitute for litigation in commercial disputes, but in labor disputes,
arbitration is a substitute for labor strife).
34
Mark E. Zelek, Labor Grievance Arbitration in the United States, 21 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 197, 197 (1989). ―Over ninety percent of American collective bargaining agreements
provide for some form of grievance procedure, ending in arbitration, to resolve all disputes
over the application or interpretation of the agreement.‖ Id. Submission of a dispute to a
mutually agreed upon third party arbitrator comes after the parties first make an attempt
to settle the dispute through negotiation between unions and management. Id. The
grievance process is a three to four step process that begins when an employee notifies a
supervisor of a grievance soon after it has occurred. Id. at 202. As negotiations for a
settlement remain at an impasse, the grievance moves up the levels of management. Id.
Once the steps have been exhausted with no settlement, the grievance is submitted to an
arbitrator. Id. at 202–03; see also Int‘l Ass‘n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Gen.
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purposes of this Note, the term ―arbitration‖ will refer to grievance
arbitration.35 Grievance arbitration refers to the use of an independent
arbitrator to resolve the contractual language issues in a labor dispute
between two parties.36 The use of this form of arbitration started with
the implementation of various pieces of legislation.37 As arbitration grew
in popularity, courts began to examine the issues of when and for what
purposes arbitration may be used.38 Finally, following the establishment
of a policy supporting arbitration, grounds for vacating awards were
carved out.39

Elec. Co., 865 F.2d 902, 903 (7th Cir. 1989) (explaining that an arbitration agreement is
generally included in a collective bargaining agreement as the final step in the grievance
process); Tracy Lipinski, Major League Baseball Players Ass‘n v. Garvey Narrows the Judicial
Strike Zone of Arbitration Awards, 36 AKRON L. REV. 325, 328–29 (2003) (discussing how
employers and unions that collectively bargain generally have a defined process for
deciding matters which arise under the labor agreement). The objective of arbitration is to
efficiently settle disputes while preventing lengthy, expensive litigation. Id. at 329; see also
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 578–80 (discussing the importance of collective
bargaining agreements between employers and unions, particularly as establishing a
system of self-government); Mark Berger, Can Employment Law Arbitration Work?, 61 UMKC
L. REV. 693, 698–700 (1993) (discussing the structure of an arbitration process included in an
agreement between an employer and a union); infra Part II.B (discussing the arbitration
process in the NFL, NBA, and MLB).
35
See, e.g., ROBERT V. MASSEY, JR., W. VA. UNIV. EXTENSION SERV., HISTORY OF
ARBITRATION AND GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES, available at
http://www.wvu.edu/~exten/depts/ilsr/arbitration_history.pdf
(explaining
that
disputes between other countries are settled through international arbitration, a method of
preventing war and promoting world peace). Commercial arbitration is used to resolve
disputes between American companies and international companies. Id. Interest
arbitration is the arbitration over terms to be included in a contract that takes place when
there is an impasse in negotiations. Id. In professional sports, it is analogous to salary
arbitration. Id.
36
Id.; see also Zelek, supra note 34, at 198 (―The major advantage of grievance
arbitration . . . is that it enables labor and management to settle their differences while the
contract is in effect without strikes or lockouts.‖). The role of an independent arbitrator is
usually filled by a lawyer but can be filled by non-lawyers such as college professors with
expertise in economics or political science. Id. at 203. The selection of an arbitrator can be
made part of the initial agreement between two parties, or an arbitrator can be chosen from
a list of arbitrators by order of preference for each dispute that makes it to arbitration. Id.
37
See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the enactment of arbitration legislation).
38
See infra Part II.A.2 (explaining the various court holdings that define the use of
grievance arbitration).
39
See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing statutory and judicial grounds for vacation of
arbitration awards).
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Arbitration and Legislation

Arbitration did not become popular in the United States until the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.40 Initially, courts were
reluctant to give significant weight to private arbitration awards. 41
However, federal and state legislatures adopted measures to increase the
legal enforcement of arbitration agreements.42 Congress enacted the
Federal Arbitration Act (―FAA‖), which made commercial arbitration
agreements ―valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.‖ 43 The FAA also

See FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 2 (Marlin M.
Volz & Edward P. Goggin eds., 5th ed. 1997) (discussing the use of arbitration throughout
the history of the world). King Solomon used an arbitration procedure similar to that
which is used today. Id. Phillip II included arbitration in treaties as a method to resolve
disputes over territories. Id. Commercial disputes in the Middle Ages and between Native
American tribes were settled by arbitration. Id.; see also MASSEY, supra note 35, at 23
(discussing the growth of grievance arbitration clauses from the late 19th century and on).
The United Mine Workers Association incorporated a grievance arbitration clause into its
constitution at its founding convention in 1890. MASSEY supra note 35, at 2. Grievance
arbitration in labor disputes became the popular process of alternative dispute resolution
around the time of World War II as a method to avoid work stoppages affecting the
production of war materials. Id. at 3. By 1944, 73% of American labor contracts contained
an arbitration clause. Id. That number rose to 95% in the 1980‘s and has continued to rise
to 98% today. Id.
41
Berger, Arbitrability, supra note 33, at 754. ―Private arbitration was viewed as usurping
the jurisdiction of the legal system, and therefore courts permitted the parties to refuse to
abide by their prior agreement to arbitrate without fear of any significant legal sanction.‖
Id.; see also Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874) (discussing a line of cases that held
arbitration agreements illegal if they attempted to supersede the jurisdiction of the courts);
Wood v. Humphrey, 114 Mass. 185, 186 (1873) (discouraging the elimination of the courts
of jurisdiction by an arbitration agreement).
42
Berger, Arbitrability, supra note 33, at 755 n.7. New York supported the legal
enforcement of arbitration agreements when it enacted an arbitration statute in 1920. 1920
N.Y. Laws 275.2, codified at N.Y. ARBITRATION LAW §§ 7501–14 (McKinney 1998 & Supp.
2010); see also, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 5701–5725 (Supp. 2008) (enacting the Uniform
Arbitration Act [―UAA‖] in the state of Delaware); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1–23 (2007
& Supp. 2010) (enacting the UAA in Illinois); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, §§ 1–19 (2004
& Supp. 2010) (enacting the UAA in Massachusetts).
43
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); see also Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273–77
(1995) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act was validly established by Congress under
its Commerce Clause power and that any transaction involving interstate commerce
between two parties who have reached an arbitration agreement is within the scope of the
FAA); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1984) (holding that the FAA‘s creation
under Congress‘s Commerce Clause authority makes it enforceable in both federal and
state courts); Lipinski, supra note 34, at 330–31 (discussing Congress‘s enactment of the
FAA and other arbitration legislation). A segment of labor arbitration, however, does not
seem to be within the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act based upon statutory language,
which states that ―nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.‖ 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
40
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provided for a stay of litigation in cases involving arbitrable issues and a
court order that would compel arbitration of the dispute as well as
discovery of material evidence.44 Despite congressional intent to reduce
the courts‘ hostility towards commercial arbitration agreements, parties
to labor agreements did not find the same relief in the FAA. 45
Labor disputes between employers and unions that have collectively
bargained arbitration agreements are governed by section 301(a) of the
Labor-Management Relations Act.46 With the creation of the Act,
Congress expressed its preference for arbitration rather than strikes or
litigation as a method to resolve labor disputes. 47 The Supreme Court
held in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama that
section 301 of the Act allows a party to sue in federal court to compel the

9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4, 7. If a court is satisfied that a matter is arbitrable under the agreement
at issue, it will stay the action until the arbitration process has been completed. Id. § 3. A
party that alleges a failure to arbitrate a dispute in the face of a written agreement to
arbitrate may petition a United States district court to hand down an order to follow the
arbitration procedure. Id. The arbitrator has the authority to summon any person as a
witness and to bring any material piece of evidence before the hearing. Id. § 7; see also In re
Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 228 F.3d 865, 870–71 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that an arbitrator has
the power to order the production of documents by any party prior to a hearing because it
promotes the policy of efficiency). But see Life Receivables Trust v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd‘s
of London, 549 F.3d 210, 216–17 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that the arbitrator does not have the
authority to order discovery from non-parties).
45
See Dean Foods Co. v. United Steelworkers, 911 F. Supp. 1116, 1123 (N.D. Ind. 1995)
(applying the FAA to commercial arbitration awards in areas of interstate commerce and
admiralty but not to labor arbitration awards); Kenneth M. Curtin, An Examination of
Contractual Expansion and Limitation of Judicial Review or Arbitral Awards, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 337, 339 (2000) (citing H.R. REP. NO 68-96, at 1 (1924)) (explaining Congress‘s
intention to reverse past animosity towards arbitration agreements and to make them as
enforceable as other contracts). Arbitration in the context of commercial disputes is
different from that of a labor dispute because each provides different functions. United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960). In labor disputes,
arbitration is closely linked to CBAs that are a more encompassing code of governance than
contracts that serve as the basis of commercial disputes. Id.; see also Ludwig Honold Mfg.
Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1127 (3d Cir. 1969) (explaining that the FAA can be used as
guidance in judicial review of labor agreements); Textile Workers Union v. Am. Thread
Co., 113 F. Supp. 137, 142 (D. Mass. 1953) (explaining that federal courts should use the
FAA as a guide in enforcing labor arbitration agreements).
46
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2006). Section 301(a) of the Act provides that ―[s]uits for violation of
contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees . . . or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties.‖ Id.; see Am. Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. at 142
(concluding that § 301 gives federal courts specific authority to enforce arbitration
agreements in labor contracts). See generally Lipinski, supra note 34, at 327 n.10 (discussing
Congress‘s enactment of § 301 of the LMRA).
47
29 U.S.C. § 173(d). Section 203(d) of the Act provides that the final method agreed
upon by the parties is the method for settling grievances over the interpretation of a
collective bargaining agreement. Id.
44
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other party to either submit to arbitration of a dispute as previously
agreed or to comply with an arbitrator‘s award.48
A CBA used in professional sports leagues that contains arbitration
agreements is subject to the rules of the National Labor Relations Act
(―NLRA‖).49
Under this Act, employers and the labor union
representing the employees must collectively bargain all conditions of
employment.50 Courts have held that an organization must also use
collective bargaining to establish a grievance settlement procedure. 51
NFL provisions not created through arms-length bargaining may be
improper and not part of the agreement. 52

353 U.S. 448, 458–59 (1957); see also Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79,
83–86 (2002) (discussing the types of gateway procedural questions that are subject to
judicial resolution as opposed to arbitration); First Options of Chi. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938,
944–45 (1995) (discussing the court‘s role in determining if there was an agreement to
arbitrate an issue); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 556–58 (1964)
(holding that procedural issues are questions to be resolved through the arbitration process
because adjudication by courts could entangle it with substantive issues subject only to
arbitration).
49
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169; see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) (holding that
Major League Baseball is a business engaged in interstate commerce); NLRB v. Fainblatt,
306 U.S. 601, 606–08 (1939) (explaining that industries involved in or affecting interstate
commerce are subject to the NLRA); Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass‘n, 409 F. Supp. 233, 270 (W.D. Mo. 1976), aff‘d on other grounds, 532
F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976) (explaining that the MLB CBA is subject to the same laws as a CBA
in another industry).
50
29 U.S.C. § 157. Labor unions are given their authority under section 7 of the NLRA,
which states that employees have the right to organize themselves into labor organizations
and collectively bargain through self-chosen representatives. Id. Employees designate
representatives that shall collectively bargain for ―rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment.‖ Id. § 159(a).
51
See NLRB v. Indep. Stave Co., 591 F.2d 443, 446 (8th Cir. 1979) (explaining that
grievance-arbitration procedures are terms of employment and mandatory subjects of
bargaining under the NLRA).
52
See, e.g., Mackey v. Nat‘l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 616 (8th Cir. 1976) (presenting
an example of a rule that was improper because bargaining did not take place in its
implementation). The NFL‘s implementation of the Rozelle Rule restricting player
movement was not the result of ―bona fide arm‘s-length bargaining‖ but instead the
unilateral creation by the teams. Id. The Rule was not a quid pro quo for other benefits to
the players and was outside the scope of the CBA. Id.; see, e.g., Nat‘l Football League
Players Ass‘n v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 12, 17 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that a rule that would fine
players $200 for leaving the bench area during a fight was unilaterally implemented by the
owners and was therefore improper). The commissioner must consult with both parties in
the promulgation of a rule. Id. See generally PAUL D. STAUDOHAR, PLAYING FOR DOLLARS:
LABOR RELATIONS AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS 71–72 (1996) (explaining that the Rozelle Rule
allowed the commissioner to force a team that signed a free agent to compensate the team
to which the free agent previously belonged).
48
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Arbitration in the Court System

The Court further established governing principles for judicial
review of arbitration agreements and awards in a group of cases known
as the ―Steelworkers Trilogy.‖53 First, when a party attempts to compel
another party to arbitrate, a court will presume that the dispute is
arbitrable.54 To rule otherwise, a court would need to have nearly
definitive evidence that it was not within the intentions of the parties to
arbitrate that dispute.55 Therefore, if an arbitration agreement is
particularly broad, the chance of a dispute escaping arbitration is
minimal.56
The second principle gained from the Trilogy is that judicial review
of an arbitrator‘s award is very limited. 57 The scope of review does not
extend to the merits of the award or the principles of interpretation that
the arbitrator applied to the agreement. 58 Instead, a court may review an
arbitration award in reference to various statutory or judicial grounds for
See generally United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960)
(limiting the judicial review of an arbitrator‘s reward); United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (discussing how a court should determine whether
parties intended to arbitrate a dispute); United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960) (explaining when there is a presumption that a dispute is arbitrable).
54
See Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567–68 (explaining that lower courts are never to decide
the merits of, or whether there is equity in, a grievance that is filed if there is an agreement
between the two parties to submit all grievances to arbitration). This includes any
grievance that seems frivolous on its face. Id. at 568. Deciding the merits ―under the guise
of interpreting the grievance procedure of collective bargaining agreements . . . usurps a
function which under that regime is entrusted to the arbitration tribunal.‖ Id. at 569.
55
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582. The Court held that ―[a]n order to
arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the
asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.‖ Id. at 582–83; see also
Berger, Arbitrability, supra note 33, at 769–70 (explaining that there should be a presumption
of arbitrability).
56
Zelek, supra note 34, at 200–01. By establishing this rule, the Court made it very
difficult for parties to an arbitration agreement to utilize the courts. Id.; see, e.g. Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) (discussing the
presumption that in commercial contract disputes the controlling intentions of the parties
are generously construed towards arbitrability); Moses H. Cone Mem‘l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 (1983) (explaining that in non-labor cases brought under the
FAA, questions as to arbitrability ―should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the
problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability‖).
57
See Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597 (stating that an arbitrator‘s award is
legitimate if it ―draws its essence‖ from the contract between the two parties).
58
See id. at 596 (―The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the
proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements.‖); Zelek, supra note
34, at 201 (explaining that an arbitrator‘s informed judgment will be used in interpreting
and applying the terms of a CBA to a grievance).
53

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 1 [2010], Art. 11

370

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

vacation or modification.59 Furthermore, this rule reflects the policy that
the parties to an arbitration agreement bargained for an arbitrator‘s
interpretation of the agreement.60
Furthering these principles, the Court stated in United Paperworkers
International Union v. Misco, Inc. that so long as an arbitrator acts within
his or her authority to properly interpret or apply the agreement, a court
cannot overturn that decision even if the arbitrator bases his decision on
mistakes of fact or law.61 The Court emphasized that arbitration,
grievance procedures, and the responsibilities of the arbitrator are
essential to the collective bargaining process and courts can only
invalidate the decisions on certain grounds. 62
3.

Vacating or Modifying Arbitration Awards

Although courts generally give great deference to arbitration
awards, courts may vacate the decision of an arbitrator in some
circumstances.63 In labor disputes, courts have stated that an arbitration
See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing the grounds for invalidating an arbitration award); see
also Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 596 (explaining that giving courts expansive
judicial review, including final authority on the merits of the arbitration awards, would
undercut the federal policy of making arbitration the primary method of resolution in labor
disputes). If the merits of every arbitration award were reviewable by a court, the
provisions of an arbitration agreement pertaining to finality would be meaningless. Enter.
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 599.
60
Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 599. Because the parties bargained for the
arbitrator‘s interpretation and construction of the collective bargaining agreement, a court
has no standing to overrule the arbitrator based on a different opinion of interpretation.
Id.; see Zelek, supra note 34, at 201 (explaining that if a party to an agreement disagrees with
the contracted-for arbitrator‘s interpretation of the agreement, that party may renegotiate
the terms of the agreement or the arbitrator used).
61
484 U.S. 29, 37–38 (1987). A court should not reject the factual findings or the
interpretation of the contract by an arbitrator. Id. The Court stated the following in
regards to judicial review of mistakes of law or fact:
Because the parties have contracted to have disputes settled by an
arbitrator chosen by them rather than by a judge, it is the arbitrator‘s
view of the facts and of the meaning of the contract that they have
agreed to accept. Courts thus do not sit to hear claims of factual or
legal error by an arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing
decisions of lower courts.
Id.; see also Major League Baseball Players Ass‘n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509–10 (2001)
(discussing that the limited role of the courts does not include evaluating the merits of the
grievance); E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 62
(2000) (explaining that if a court decides that an arbitrator has acted within his scope of
authority, that court should treat the arbitrator‘s decisions as representative of the
agreement between the two parties regarding the dispute).
62
United Paperworkers Int‘l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987).
63
See Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 599 (holding that a court cannot overrule an
arbitrator based on a difference of opinion because the parties bargained for the
59
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award can be overturned if an arbitrator goes outside the terms of the
agreement and ―dispense[s] his own brand of industrial justice.‖ 64 This
does not include declining to follow the precedent of previous decisions
because arbitrators are not bound by the decisions of previous
arbitrators.65 In some cases, however, courts have overturned arbitration
agreements for egregious error of law.66
A lack of reasonable procedural protection can also lead to the
vacation of disciplinary decisions. 67 Reasonable procedures include
sufficient advance notice of a claim, the opportunity for a hearing, and
the orderly presentation of evidence. 68 If procedures are insufficient, a
sanction may be per se illegal because it is inherently defective. 69
Arbitration agreements are also affected if there is not a definitive

interpretation of the arbitrator); Berger, Arbitrability, supra note 33, at 764 (stating that the
current state of arbitration law includes a ―highly deferential standard of review‖);
Lipinski, supra note 34, at 334–39 (discussing both statutory and common law grounds for
overturning arbitration awards).
64
Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597 (―[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation
and application of the collective bargaining agreement . . . .‖); see also W.R. Grace & Co. v.
Local 759, Int‘l Union of United Rubber, 461 U.S. 757, 766–67 (1983) (discussing when a
violation of public policy is great enough to overturn an arbitration award). Labor
arbitration awards can also be vacated for narrow public policy reasons. Id.; see also Harry
T. Edwards, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Clash Between the Public Policy
Exception and the Duty to Bargain, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 3–5 (1988) (explaining that a broad
public policy exception overturning arbitration awards is improper because it ignores the
public policies in favor of arbitration).
65
Int‘l Union v. Dana Corp., 278 F.3d 548, 555–56 (6th Cir. 2002). Most circuits have held
that labor arbitrators are only bound by previous arbitrators‘ decisions if the CBA
stipulates the creation of such a common law. Id.
66
Misco, 484 U.S. at 37–38; see also LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody, & Co., 246 F.3d 702, 706
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that an arbitration award could be overturned for manifest
disregard of the law); Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse: Judicial
Review of Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 89–98 (1997) (discussing the standard of
―Manifest Disregard of the Law‖).
67
See John C. Weistart, Player Discipline in Professional Sports: The Antitrust Issues, 18
WM. & MARY L. REV. 703, 710–13 (1977) (discussing the use of reasonableness as a standard
of review for disciplinary decisions). Notions of procedural protection are similar to
constitutional due process requirements. Id. at 713. However, those requirements ―must
be tempered by the peculiar nature of . . . private decision-making.‖ Id.; see also, e.g., Bridge
Corp. of Am. v. Am. Contract Bridge League, Inc., 428 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1970)
(discussing the use of an unreasonableness rule to evaluate agreements and practices in
labor self-regulation).
68
See Weistart, supra note 67, at 712, 715 (explaining what defines procedural fairness).
69
See, e.g., Blalock v. Ladies Prof‘l Golf Ass‘n, 359 F. Supp. 1260, 1265–66 (N.D. Ga. 1973)
(holding that the procedures in place were insufficient and so the sanction handed down to
the female golfer was per se illegal and a violation of antitrust laws). The suspension was
imposed without a proper hearing. Id. at 1265.
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standard of review on which an arbitrator can base his decision. 70
Moreover, if the sanction is banishment instead of a fine, an examination
of the procedural protections is even more important. 71
The Supreme Court has stated that improper procedural aspects of
discipline can also bring about antitrust violations. 72
Procedural
protections ensure proper notice and a hearing, which allow for the
administration of antitrust laws.73 Reasonable procedures encourage
compliance with substantive antitrust statutes and discourage arbitrary
disciplinary action by the commissioner.74
Courts can overturn or modify commercial agreement awards on
statutory grounds under the FAA. 75 Courts allow modifications of
commercial arbitration awards in cases of miscalculations of awards for
a matter not submitted to the arbitrator. 76 Viable grounds for vacation
include an arbitrator exceeding his or her powers as well as improper
See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Clymer, No. 93-0348, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12175, at *7
(E.D. Pa. July 1, 1993) (holding that when an insurance contract is ambiguous as to the
proper standard to apply, the contract will be construed against the insurer). The contract
was ambiguous because it referred to two different standards of review. Id. at *2.
71
See Weistart, supra note 67, at 714 (explaining that the need for a careful procedural
structure increases with the severity of the punishment). The degree of procedural
protections required will vary with the severity of the consequences and the sophistication
of the fact situation. Id. at 714; cf. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950) (discussing the idea that in a case where the deprivation of fundamental rights and
liberties are at stake, the procedural protection provided should be ―appropriate to the
nature of the case‖).
72
See Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 364–65 (1963) (explaining that by not
providing the proper procedural safeguards, a private organization exceeds its authority to
self-regulate under antitrust laws). Antitrust laws were not created by Congress to protect
fundamentally unfair self-regulation. Id. at 364.
73
Id. at 362–63; see also Weistart, supra note 67, at 710–13 (discussing the applicability of
procedural safeguards to the adjudication of antitrust laws). Procedures ―serve to define
more precisely the factual basis for the group‘s actions as well as the defenses and
contentions of the accused‖ and allow a court to better determine ―whether a basis exists
for the discipline and whether the action is justified.‖ Weistart, supra note 67, at 711.
74
Silver, 373 U.S. at 362. While anti-trust issues are not a pertinent aspect of the
discussion or analysis in this Note, they are nevertheless a major part of the legal
discussion regarding professional sports leagues. See Marc Edelman, Are Commissioner
Suspensions Really Any Different from Illegal Group Boycotts? Analyzing Whether the NFL
Personal Conduct Policy Illegally Restrains Trade, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 631 (2009) (discussing
the anti-trust implications of the Personal Conduct Policy); Weistart, supra note 67, at 703
(explaining the anti-trust issues that arise as consequences of the structure and operation of
professional sports leagues).
75
9 U.S.C. §§ 10–11 (2006). Section 10 allows for the vacation of an award or a rehearing
by the arbitrators. Id. § 10. Section 11 provides for an order to modify or correct an
arbitration decision. Id. § 11; see also Dean Foods Co. v. United Steelworkers, 911 F. Supp.
1116, 1123 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (explaining that the FAA applies to commercial arbitration
awards in areas of interstate commerce and admiralty but not to labor arbitration awards).
76
9 U.S.C. § 11(a)–(b).
70
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behavior by the arbitrator such as fraud or corruption.77 Evident
partiality by the arbitrator is also prohibited.78 Courts evaluate evidence
of partiality or bias on the basis of whether a reasonable person would
conclude that an arbitrator is partial after reviewing all of the
circumstances.79 A material relationship existing between the arbitrator
and a party meets this standard.80 Courts have held that there is evident
Id. § 10(a)(1)–(4).
See id. § 10(a)(2) (stating that a court may vacate an arbitrator‘s award if it is shown
that the arbitrator was not impartial); Morelite Constr. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Dist. Counsel
Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the standard for
evident partiality that would violate the FAA is whether a reasonable person, after
analyzing all of the circumstances, must conclude that the arbitrator is biased); Joel
Fischman & Dirk D. Potter, Pinch-Hitting for Baseball‘s Present System—Impartial Arbitration
as a Method of Dispute Resolution, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 691, 704 (1981) (discussing how the
commissioner of Major League Baseball is ―naturally partial towards management‖
because he is in fact appointed by the owners); Weistart, supra note 67, at 715–17
(evaluating the presence of prejudice and bias in disciplinary decisions in professional
sports); see also Jan Stiglitz, Player Discipline in Team Sports, 5 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 167, 178
(1995) (discussing the importance of a neutral arbitrator in disputes over discipline of
serious off-field misconduct). But see Matthew B. Pachman, Limits on the Discretionary
Powers of Professional Sports Commissioners: A Historical and Legal Analysis of Issues Raised by
the Pete Rose Controversy, 76 VA. L. REV. 1409, 1417–20 (1990) (explaining that often
arbitrators are chosen for special expertise in an area, the type of expertise a commissioner
utilizes as the final authority); Jason M. Pollack, Take My Arbitrator, Please: Commissioner
―Best Interests‖ Disciplinary Authority in Professional Sports, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1645, 1706
(1999) (recognizing that it is difficult for a third party arbitrator to avoid imposing her
views on a ruling).
79
Morelite Constr. Corp., 748 F.2d at 84. Requiring the mere appearance of bias is too low
of a standard whereas requiring actual proof of bias is too high of a standard. Id.; see also
Labor Arbitration Rules, AM. ARBITRATION ASS‘N §§ 5, 11, 17, http://www.adr.org/
sp.asp?id=32599 (last visited Aug. 15, 2010) (stating that arbitrators must be neutral). An
arbitrator can be removed if he or she has a personal or financial interest in the outcome of
the dispute. Labor Arbitration Rules, supra, § 17. See generally Merrick T. Rossein & Jennifer
Hope, Disclosure and Disqualification Standards for Neutral Arbitrators: How Far to Cast the
Net and What is Sufficient to Vacate Award, 81 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 203, 203–09 (2007)
(discussing the requirement of impartiality and how courts have defined evident
partiality).
80
See, e.g., Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492
F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that there was evident partiality when an arbitrator‘s
employing corporation had done more than $275,000 in business with the corporation of
one of the involved parties); see also Commonwealth Coating Corp. v. Cont‘l Cas. Co., 393
U.S. 145, 148 (1968) (holding that a business relationship between the arbitrator and one of
the parties was significant despite a minimal transfer of payments). An arbitrator ―must be
unbiased . . . [and] also must avoid even the appearance of bias.‖ Id. at 150; see also The
Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, AM. BAR ASS‘N, 3–6 (Feb. 9, 2004),
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/commercial_disputes.pdf (stating that impartiality is
required to uphold the process and that an arbitrator must disclose any partial
relationships). An arbitrator must disclose ―[a]ny known existing or past financial,
business, professional or personal relationships which might reasonably affect impartiality
or lack of independence in the eyes of any of the parties.‖ The Code of Ethics, supra, at 5.
77
78
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partiality when the arbitrator‘s company was in business negotiations
with one of the parties.81 Being a part of the management team of a party
may also evidence a material relationship. 82
These grounds for vacation protect against lack of impartiality and
procedural safeguards, the same dangers that have drawn concern in the
NFL system.83 The dangers stem from a disciplinary structure made up
of several governing documents that grant the NFL Commissioner broad
authority to impose punishment on NFL players.84
Within the
disciplinary structure of professional sports, the use of a Personal
Conduct Policy with no independent appeal process distinguishes
procedures of the NFL from those of the NBA and MLB.85
B. Disciplinary Structure in Professional Sports
Executive leadership in professional sports leagues, as in any other
industry, has the power to discipline employees; however, the leagues
organize the disciplinary structure in a way that is unique to professional
sports.86 Unlike other industries, professional sports leagues subject
player-employees to discipline by both league officials and teams.87 In
general, the league commissioner holds the most powerful disciplinary
authority in terms of scope and enforcement.88 The commissioner can
Applied Indus. Materials Corp., 492 F.3d at 139.
See Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 12, 16 n.3 (8th Cir. 1974)
(explaining that although the NFL commissioner must act impartially, he may be
considered an agent of management preventing impartiality). But see Nat‘l Football League
Players Ass‘n v. Nat‘l Football League, 654 F. Supp. 2d 960, 968 (D. Minn. 2009) aff‘d by
Williams v. Nat‘l Football League, 582 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2009) (explaining that although the
presiding designee provided legal advice to one of the parties prior to the hearing, the
foreseeable partiality had been accepted by the NFLPA when it agreed to the terms of the
NFL CBA).
83
See infra Part III.A (discussing the commissioner‘s role as an arbitrator of disputes
under FAA standards).
84
See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the disciplinary structure of the NFL).
85
See infra Part II.B.1.d (discussing the Personal Conduct Policy and commissioner
authority).
86
See Molinas v. Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n, 190 F. Supp. 241, 243–44 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)
(discussing the importance of rules and regulations to a league‘s survival). In Molinas, the
plaintiff was suspended for violating a league rule prohibiting gambling. Id. at 242. The
court held that ―[e]very league . . . must have some reasonable governing rules, and these
rules must necessarily include disciplinary provisions.‖ Id. at 243–44; see also Weistart,
supra note 67, at 703 (explaining the unique relationship between players, clubs, and
commissioners with regards to discipline in professional sports).
87
See Stiglitz, supra note 78, at 167–68 (analogizing the disciplinary structure in
professional sports to that in a traditional employment setting).
88
See Milwaukee Am. Ass‘n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 299 (N.D. Ill. 1931) (explaining that
the authority given to the commissioner is as expansive as the language of the agreement
through which the office was created); RAY YASSER ET AL., SPORTS LAW CASES AND
81
82
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discipline players, coaches, and other league employees for misconduct
through fines, suspensions, or banishment.89 Within the NFL, this
authority to discipline granted to its commissioner is shaped by several
overlapping governing documents.90
1.

Governing Documents of the National Football League

Four documents form the disciplinary structure of the NFL: the
Constitution and Bylaws, the Player Contract (―the Contract‖), the CBA,
and the Personal Conduct Policy. 91 Each document shapes the authority
of and methods available to the commissioner for disciplining a player. 92
The documents prescribe how an appeal of disciplinary action is heard. 93
The following subsection will discuss the governing documents, the
authority each grants, and the appeals processes involving either the
commissioner or a grievance procedure culminating with arbitration.
a.

Disciplinary Authorities

The NFL governing documents allow both teams and the
commissioner to discipline players by vesting them with the authority to
terminate a player‘s contract for improper conduct. 94 Article VIII of the
MATERIALS 379–80 (2006) (describing the commissioner‘s dominant authority over league
matters); infra Part III.C (discussing the best interests authority given to commissioners).
89
Constitution and Bylaws of the National Football League, NAT‘L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, 28,
http://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/static/html/careers/pdf/co_.pdf (last visited
Aug. 15, 2010) [hereinafter NFL Constitution]; Major League Constitution, THE BIZ OF
BASEBALL, 2, http://www.bizofbaseball.com/docs/MLConsititutionJune2005Update.pdf
(last visited Aug. 16, 2010); NAT‘L BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASSOC‘N, NBPA COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT, A-14 to A-15 [hereinafter Misconduct], available at
http://www.nbpa.org/sites/default/files/EXHIBIT%20A.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
90
See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the role of each governing document in determining
the scope of the commissioner‘s disciplinary authority).
91
See Pachman, supra note 78, at 1417–20 (discussing which of the NFL‘s governing
documents takes precedence over the others in certain situations); see also Stiglitz, supra
note 78, at 171–72 (providing a general discussion of the overlap of rules in professional
sports).
92
See infra Part II.B.1.a (explaining how each governing document authorizes the
commissioner to discipline); infra Part II.B.1.b (explaining the sections of each document
that involve disciplinary authority and procedures).
93
See infra Part II.B.1.c (discussing the methods of appeal before the commissioner and
the grievance process).
94
NFL Player Contract, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2006–2012, 248,
available at http://nflplayers.com/images/fck/NFL%20COLLECTIVE%20BARGAINING%
20AGREEMENT%202006%20-%202012.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2010). Paragraph 11 of the
contract gives the Club the power to terminate the contract for conduct that is ―reasonably
judged by [the] Club to adversely affect or reflect on [the] Club.‖ Id. at 252. Paragraph 15
of the contract provides the Commissioner with the same authority. Id. at 253.
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NFL CBA specifically discusses ―Club Discipline,‖ giving each team
disciplinary authority over its players.95 It lists numerous infractions,
along with corresponding sanctions, for which a team may punish a
player.96 Article VIII also gives clubs authority to discipline a player for
additional infractions of conduct detrimental to the club. 97
Article XI of the NFL CBA and section 8.3 of the Constitution give
the commissioner power to discipline players as well as the ultimate
authority to resolve disputes stemming from that discipline.98 This
authority extends to situations involving coaches, owners, and NFL
employees.99 If the club and the commissioner discipline a player for the
same conduct, the commissioner‘s expansive scope of authority results in
his decision taking precedence.100
b.

Scope of the Authority

The standard NFL Player Contract defines the scope of player
conduct and discipline. 101 Upon signing a contract with any team, the
player agrees to maintain proper conduct and recognizes that ―the
95
Club Discipline, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2006–2012, 19, available at
http://nflplayers.com/images/fck/NFL%20COLLECTIVE%20BARGAINING%20AGREE
MENT%202006%20-%202012.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2010).
96
Id. at 19–20. Article VIII provides a maximum discipline schedule for conduct
including weight violations, damaging equipment, ejection from a game, losing a
playbook, and tardiness. Id.
97
Id. The maximum penalty under the detrimental conduct clause is set at a fine equal
to one week‘s salary and/or a suspension without pay for no more than four weeks. Id. at
19; see also Chiefs Give Two-Week Suspension to RB Johnson, Who Plans Appeal, NFL (Oct. 28,
2009),
http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d5d813c7eaa&template=with-videowith-comments&confirm=true (discussing the Kansas City Chiefs‘ suspension of Larry
Johnson for two weeks for using a gay slur). If Johnson planned to appeal the punishment,
the appeal could go to an independent arbitrator because it was team discipline and would
therefore fall under Article IX of the NFL CBA for a Non-Injury Grievance. Club Discipline,
supra note 95, at 20.
98
Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 34. The procedures for disputes arising from
the commissioner‘s disciplinary power are ―[n]otwithstanding anything stated in Article IX
(Non-Injury Grievance).‖ Id.
99
NFL Constitution, supra note 89, at 28. The commissioner has authority to oversee a
dispute certified to him between two or more members of the NFL. Id. The commissioner
may preside over a dispute between a player or coach and any team. Id. This includes
disputes among players, coaches, or teams as well as those between players and league
officials on and off the field. Id.
100
Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 35. ―The Commissioner and a Club will not
discipline a player for the same act or conduct. The Commissioner‘s disciplinary action
will preclude or supersede disciplinary action by any Club for the same act or conduct.‖
Id.; see also Club Discipline, supra note 95, at 20 (explaining that discipline imposed by the
commissioner supersedes team discipline when it is for the same action).
101
NFL Player Contract, supra note 94, at 252–53. This includes either on-field or off-field
conduct. Id. at 248.
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success of professional football depends largely on public respect for and
approval of those associated with the game.‖ 102 The Contract explains
that a team or the commissioner can discipline players for conduct that
reflects poorly on the character and integrity of the game or the player
and diminishes public confidence.103 The Constitution also grants the
commissioner authority to discipline any player who commits such
conduct.104 As the ultimate arbiter, the commissioner uses his judgment
to define conduct that is detrimental to the best interests of the NFL.105
The commissioner may fine, suspend, or terminate a player‘s
contract when he determines that a player‘s conduct was harmful to the
NFL.106 While there are set fine amounts and punishments listed in the
Constitution, section 8.13(B) allows the commissioner to recommend an
increased punishment when he deems necessary. 107 The commissioner‘s
decision is final and unappealable if the owners and an executive
committee accept that recommendation.108

Id. at 248. The player ―agrees to give his best efforts and loyalty to the Club‖ for the
public approval of the game. Id. The contract is between the player and team and is valid
for the specified term. Id.
103
Id. at 252–53. A team may terminate a player‘s contract for personal conduct that
adversely reflects on the team. Id. at 252. The contract recognizes the value of the integrity
of the game and focuses on conduct involved with gambling activity, drugs and substance
abuse, and any other detrimental conduct. Id. at 253.
104
NFL Constitution, supra note 89, at 29–35. Gambling and conduct harmful to the
League‘s best interests is discussed specifically in the Constitution as grounds for
disciplinary action. Id. at 34–35. If a player is found to have bet on any games in the
League or failed to report knowledge of a betting scheme, the Commissioner has the
authority to discipline that player in various ways including banishment. Id. at 34.
105
Id. at 35. The Commissioner‘s arbitration authority includes ―[a]ny dispute
involving . . . members in the League or any players or employees of the members of the
League . . . that in the opinion of the Commissioner constitutes conduct detrimental to the
best interests of the League.‖ Id. at 28; see also Janine Young Kim & Matthew J. Parlow, OffCourt Misbehavior: Sports Leagues and Private Punishment, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 573,
576 (2009) (explaining that the league commissioner has ―indeterminate discretion‖ to
define conduct that is detrimental to the best interests of the league).
106
NFL Player Contract, supra note 94, at 253. The player has the opportunity for a
hearing with representation in front of the commissioner before the disciplinary decision
takes effect. Id.; see also supra note 23 (providing several examples of Goodell‘s disciplinary
decisions in response to instances of detrimental conduct).
107
NFL Constitution, supra note 89, at 31–34; see also Belichick Draws $500,000 Fine, but
Avoids Suspension, ESPN (Sept. 14, 2007), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=
3018338 (stating that the NFL fined Bill Belichick $500,000 and deprived the New England
Patriots of a draft pick for their involvement in spying on an opposing team). Goodell
followed the guidelines under the Constitution for disciplining a coach or team for a
violation of the competitive aspects of the game. NFL Constitution, supra note 89, at 31.
108
NFL Constitution, supra note 89, at 31–34. The Executive Committee is made up of one
representative from each team. Id. at 23.
102
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Grievance Procedures Available for Players

The NFL CBA, entered into by League management and the NFLPA,
governs the terms and conditions of employment in the NFL. 109 It is the
preeminent document in terms of governance over the League‘s
disciplinary and grievance policies.110 The NFL CBA states two
procedures for player appeals: the grievance procedure and an appeal to
the commissioner.111
The Non-Injury Grievance procedures in Article IX of the NFL CBA
govern disputes over team discipline of a player.112 A player may file a
grievance about a dispute that involves interpretation of the CBA.113 The
procedure begins with filing a grievance, continues with the selection of
arbitrators, and ends with a hearing that results in the arbitrator‘s final
decision.114 Thus, Article IX appears to give a player an opportunity for
109
Preamble,
NFL
COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
AGREEMENT
2006–2012,
3,
http://nflplayers.com/images/fck/NFL%20COLLECTIVE%20BARGAINING%20AGREE
MENT%202006%20-%202012.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2010). League management is
represented by the NFL Management Council (―NFLMC‖) while the NFLPA represents the
players. Id.
110
See Terwilliger v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 882 F.2d 1033, 1040 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding
that in the case of a dispute, a bargaining agreement takes precedence over other
documents because of the national policy encouraging uniform labor law and arbitration);
1 ROBERT C. BERRY & GLENN M. WONG, LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRIES 139
(1986) (explaining that in the case of a dispute, a mutually agreed-upon collective
agreement takes precedence); see also Pachman, supra note 78, at 1417–20 (discussing the
hierarchy of the league governing documents).
111
Non-Injury Grievance, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2006–2012, 23,
http://nflplayers.com/images/fck/NFL%20COLLECTIVE%20BARGAINING%20AGREE
MENT%202006%20-%202012.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2010) (discussing the process of the
grievance procedure, which includes filing, notice, hearing, and the arbitrator‘s award);
Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 34 (explaining that when a player is disciplined by
the commissioner for conduct detrimental to the NFL, the commissioner will hear all
appeals); see also NFL Player Contract, supra note 94, at 252, 254 (explaining that under the
Player Contract an arbitrator comes into play in two situations: injury grievances and
disputes over the interpretation of the Contract). These situations give way to the
procedure outlined in the current NFL CBA. Id.
112
Club Discipline, supra note 95, at 20. ―Any dispute involved in Club discipline may be
made the subject of a non-injury grievance under Article IX.‖ Id.
113
Non-Injury Grievance, supra note 111, at 23.
114
Id. at 23–27. A player, team, the league management, or the NFLPA must file a
grievance within forty-five days of the incident on which the grievance is based and
provide written notice to the NFL and the parties involved. Id. at 23. If the grievance is not
resolved following an answer from the opposing parties, an appeal may be made by filing
a written notice with the Notice Arbitrator. Id. at 23–24. ―[E]ach party will submit to the
other copies of all documents, reports and records relevant to the dispute‖ no later than ten
days prior to the hearing. Id. at 24. The hearing will take place in front of an arbitration
panel made up of four arbitrators jointly accepted by the NFLPA and Management
Council. Id. at 24–25. Each party has the right to discharge any of the arbitrators by
serving written notice on the arbitrator and the opposing party. Id. An arbitrator will be
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independent arbitration. However, a clause in the opening section
supersedes its application by requiring players to use any of the other
dispute resolution procedures included in the CBA, such as an appeal to
the commissioner.115
Players disciplined by the commissioner for conduct that is
detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, professional
football can appeal to the commissioner in writing. 116 Upon receiving an
appeal, the commissioner, or a person designated by the commissioner,
will preside over a hearing in which the player may be represented by
Yet, the
counsel and may present all relevant evidence.117
commissioner‘s written decision is the ―final and complete disposition of
the dispute and will be binding upon the player(s) and Club(s)
involved.‖118 That final authority is a part of the NFL commissioner‘s
broad authority under the Personal Conduct Policy. 119
d.

Personal Conduct Policy

The NFL league management and owners created the Conduct
Policy in May 2000 as a response to increased criminal conduct by NFL
players.120 This policy symbolized the NFL‘s prevention-first attitude by
chosen from the remaining candidates based on his available dates. Id. at 25–26. Parties
involved will have the right to present all evidence relevant to the grievance including
witnesses. Id. The arbitrator will issue a written decision which may not alter the
provisions of the CBA in any way or grant additional remedies not provided for in the
CBA. Id. at 26; see also Impartial Arbitrator, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2006–
2012, 152, http://nflplayers.com/images/fck/NFL%20COLLECTIVE%20BARGAINING%
20AGREEMENT%202006%20-%202012.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2010) (providing a
complete description of the role of an independent arbitrator as utilized in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement); Injury Grievance, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, 28,
http://nflplayers.com/images/fck/NFL%20COLLECTIVE%20BARGAINING%20AGREE
MENT%202006%20-%202012.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2010) (listing nearly identical
procedures for an injury grievance).
115
Non-Injury Grievance, supra note 111, at 23. Grievances filed under this section give
way to any CBA procedure that requires an impartial arbitrator, special master, or the court
system to resolve the dispute. Id.
116
Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 34. Appeals must be submitted to the
commissioner in writing within twenty days of receiving the punishment. Id.
117
Id. at 34–35. The hearing takes place within ten days of the receipt of notice of appeal.
Id. at 34. The commissioner confers with the Executive Director of the NFLPA regarding
who will serve as the commissioner‘s designee. Id.
118
Id. The commissioner may alter, but never increase, fines and suspensions for on-field
unnecessary roughness or unsportsmanlike conduct penalties. Id.
119
See infra Part II.B.1.d (explaining how the creation of the Policy increased the
commissioner‘s disciplinary authority, which includes disciplining misconduct that falls
short of criminal behavior).
120
Don Banks, Taking a Stand Against Violence: League Adopts Broader ‗Personal Conduct
Policy,‘ CNN SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 23, 2000, 9:27 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.
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focusing more on deterring future misconduct through preventative
programs.121 Despite the creation of the Conduct Policy, players
continued to engage in off-field misconduct when Goodell became
commissioner in 2006.122 As a result, Goodell responded with longer
suspensions and a stricter Personal Conduct Policy in both writing and
application.123
com/football/nfl/news/2000/05/23/banks_tuesdaymeetings/; see also Joe Donatelli &
Thomas O‘Toole, Wake Up, NFL: You‘ve Got a Violence Problem, ESPN (Feb. 1, 2000),
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=329054&type=story (discussing the increasing
occurrences of player misconduct that include violence); Guilty on Three of Four: Jury
Acquits Carruth on First-Degree Murder Charge, CNN SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 19, 2001, 3:41
PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/football/nfl/news/2001/01/19/carruth_trial_ap/
(discussing Rae Carruth, who was found guilty of conspiracy to murder his child‘s
mother); Lewis Murder Charges Dropped: Ravens Star Accepts Misdemeanor Charge, Will
Testify, CNN SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 5, 2000, 9:31 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.
com/football/nfl/news/2000/06/04/lewis_agreement/ (explaining the situation in which
Ray Lewis pled guilty to obstruction of justice charges, avoiding possible charges for
aggravated assault and murder stemming from an incident that left two men dead); Brent
Schrotenboer, NFL Arrests Database, SIGNONSANDIEGO, http://legacy.signonsandiego.
com/sports/nfl/arrests.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2010) (listing the arrests of NFL players
and the resulting punishments). Between January 1, 2000, and the implementation of the
Conduct Policy in May 2000, there were nearly twenty incidents that resulted in arrests or
citations more serious than speeding tickets. Id. These incidents included charges of
murder, assault, various drugs and weapons charges, felony theft, sexual assault, domestic
violence, and driving under the influence. Id.
121
Banks, supra note 120.
122
King, supra note 23; see also Judy Battista, Goodell Says He‘ll Punish N.F.L.‘s Problem
Players, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/27/sports/
football/27nfl.html [hereinafter Battista, Problem Players] (discussing NFL players that
would become ―targets of Goodell‘s tougher personal-conduct policy‖); Timeline of Trouble
for Pacman Jones, supra note 23 (discussing plans by Goodell to meet with several players
regarding their run-ins with the law). Prior to the 2007 season, Adam ―Pacman‖ Jones had
been arrested and charged with various felonies and misdemeanors on numerous
occasions. Id.; see also Schrotenboer, supra note 120 (listing the arrests of NFL players and
the resulting punishments since 2000). In the time period between the creation of the
Conduct Policy in May 2000, and the hiring of Commissioner Goodell in 2006, there were at
least 218 incidents alleging NFL players of criminal conduct and resulting in either arrest or
citation. Schrotenboer, supra note 120. Since January 1, 2000, there have been more than
475 incidents of alleged criminal conduct by NFL players. Id.; see also NFL Aims to Tackle
Public
Relations
Problem
of
Player
Arrests!,
TOTAL
CRIMINAL
DEFENSE,
http://www.totalcriminaldefense.com/news/celebrity-spotlight/miscellaneous/nflplayer-arrests.aspx (last visited Aug. 17, 2010) (explaining that 40% of the arrests since 2000
have come from about fifty players or 3% of the players in the league).
123
See Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 2; Judy Battista, N.F.L. Assesses Lengthy Bans for
Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2007, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
9B01EFDE123FF932A25757C0A 9619C8B63 [hereinafter Battista, Bans for Misconduct]
(explaining that Goodell suspended Adam Jones and Chris Henry in order to protect the
integrity of the NFL); New Commish Goodell Gets Tough Defending ‗Shield,‘ CBS SPORTS (Apr.
10, 2007), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/story/10119610 (discussing the importance of a
strict conduct policy in defending the integrity and reputation of the league from illegal
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The new Policy reiterates that players, coaches, and other NFL
employees are required to refrain from conduct detrimental to the
NFL.124 The language now states that the League expects the players to
act ―in a way that is responsible, promotes the values upon which the
league is based, and is lawful.‖125 The standard of conduct in the
Personal Conduct Policy is higher than simply avoiding criminal activity
because conduct does not need to reach the level of criminal liability to
be in violation of the Policy.126
The Personal Conduct Policy grants the commissioner broad
The player‘s only
disciplinary authority with little restriction. 127
appellate right under the CBA is for a hearing in front of the
commissioner.128 The implementation of this broad authority has led
critics to frame it as a violation of the NLRA, which regulates the
and irresponsible conduct). Compare Schrotenboer, supra note 120 (stating that in 2006,
Jared Allen received a two-game suspension following a second arrest in less than five
months for driving under the influence, and reporting that Ray Lewis was fined $250,000
based on charges of murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault in the death of two
men and his guilty plea for obstruction of justice), with NFL Aims to Tackle Public Relations
Problem of Player Arrests, supra note 122 (explaining that Goodell suspended Adam Jones for
an entire season without pay, which resulted in a loss of more than $1.2 million in salary,
restricted Jones from going to any night clubs, and gave Jones a curfew following several
arrests, including his final arrest for which he was sentenced to one year of probation).
124
Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 2, at 1.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 1. A player can be disciplined for any improper conduct, even if it merely
presents a risk of damaging the reputation of the NFL. Id. at 1–2. Misconduct includes
conduct that imposes an inherent danger to others as well as conduct that impairs the
integrity or reputation of the NFL and its teams. Id. at 2. This includes any threatening
behavior towards players, coaches, or other league employees in or outside the workplace.
Id. at 1; see also Young Kim & Parlow, supra note 105, at 577–78 (discussing the differences
between the Conduct Policy and the previous policy). The new Policy is in ―stark contrast
to the NFL‘s previous conduct policy, which required the NFL Commissioner to withhold
punishment of an athlete unless there was a conviction or some form of plea by the
athlete.‖ Young, Kim & Parlow, supra note 105, at 578.
127
Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 2, at 2–3. The Conduct Policy contains no
restrictions on the magnitude of punishment, stating only that upon completion of an
investigation into alleged improper conduct, ―the Commissioner will have full authority to
impose discipline as warranted.‖ Id. at 2.
128
Id. at 3. The Personal Conduct Policy states that players that appeal disciplinary
decisions are ―entitled to a prompt hearing pursuant to Article XI of the [CBA] and the NFL
Constitution and Bylaws, to be conducted by the Commissioner or his designee.‖ Id.; see
also Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 34 (stating that all appeals will be made to the
commissioner); Jim Wyatt, Commissioner Hears ‗Pacman‘ Jones‘ Appeal, USA TODAY, May 12,
2007, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/titans/2007-05-11-pacman-appeal_
N.htm (explaining that Commissioner Goodell would preside over Adam Jones‘ appellate
hearing for discipline for off-field misconduct). Because any further appeal could only be
to the commissioner under the Conduct Policy, Jones‘s only other option would be a
lawsuit through the court system. Wyatt, supra.
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relationship between labor unions and workers and requires both
impartiality and collective bargaining of all rules and policies that will
have a practical effect on the working conditions of employees. 129
Working conditions in the NFL include salary and player movement. 130
Because the commissioner created the Conduct Policy, controls the
magnitude of punishments, and sits as the final arbiter for players
disciplined under the policy, the NFL may be violating the NLRA.131
The disciplinary structure and appeal rights under the Policy that
provide this broad and improper authority to the commissioner are
significantly different from the structures of other professional sports
leagues.132

29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006). Under the NLRA, employees designate representatives
that shall collectively bargain for ―rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment.‖ Id. § 159(a); see also Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n v.
NLRB, 503 F.2d 12, 17 (8th Cir. 1974) (stating that the commissioner violated the NLRA ―by
unilaterally promulgating and implementing a rule‖ that would institute an automatic fine
for any player that left the bench during a fight or altercation on the field); Pollack, supra
note 78, at 1709 (discussing the effect of the Conduct Policy on working conditions); infra
Part III.B (explaining how the Policy can be characterized as affecting working conditions
without collective bargaining).
130
See infra text accompanying note 217 (discussing rules that affect the salary of players
and therefore affect working conditions).
131
See Adam B. Marks, Note, Personnel Foul on the National Football League Players
Association: How Union Executive Director Gene Upshaw Failed the Union‘s Members by Not
Fighting the Enactment of the Personal Conduct Policy, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1581, 1593–98 (2008)
(discussing concerns regarding an inherent lack of impartiality by the commissioner in the
exercise of his disciplinary authority); infra Part III.B (discussing the implementation of the
Policy as a working condition); see also Atlanta Nat‘l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn,
432 F. Supp. 1213, 1226 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (recognizing that a commissioner‘s authority to
issue disciplinary action is framed by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement). If
the commissioner exercises his or her punitive authority outside the scope of the
agreement, the commissioner breaches that agreement. Atlanta Nat‘l League Baseball Club,
Inc., 432 F. Supp. at 1226; see also Nat‘l Football League Mgmt. Council & Nat‘l Football
League Players Ass‘n, 203 N.L.R.B. 958, 969 (1973) (explaining that a unilateral change in a
working condition constitutes an unfair labor practice that violates the collective
bargaining agreement); In re Arbitration Among Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n, Nat‘l
Football League Mgmt. Council, & Nat‘l Football League (Oct. 25, 1986) (Kasher, Arb.), cited
in Ethan Lock, The Legality Under the National Labor Relations Act of Attempts By National
Football League Owners to Unilaterally Implement Drug Testing Programs, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 1,
15 (1987) (imposing a new drug testing program would be a unilateral change in the
conditions of employment, which were not collectively bargained). But see Marquez v.
Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33, 44 (1998) (recognizing that a labor union has a duty
of fair representation under § 9(a) of the NLRA). While the NFLPA may not have been in
breach by allowing the unilateral implementation of the Conduct Policy, it does have a
duty of fair representation ―to serve the interests of all members without hostility or
discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty,
and to avoid arbitrary conduct.‖ Id. (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967)).
132
See infra Part II.B.2–3 (discussing the disciplinary structures of the MLB and NBA).
129
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Discipline in Major League Baseball

In 1921, Major League Baseball (―MLB‖) became one of the first of
the major professional sports leagues to create the office of the
commissioner, doing so through the Major League Agreement
(―MLA‖).133 Kenesaw Landis became the first MLB commissioner in
response to the gambling problems that were tarnishing the image of the
game.134 Landis first exercised his power by banning from baseball each
of the Chicago White Sox players who allegedly threw the 1919 World
Series, although each player was acquitted of related charges in state
court.135 Parties challenged this powerful authority vested in the MLB
Commissioner‘s office but the courts found it valid under the MLA.136
The Major League Constitution, formerly the MLA, and the Basic
Agreement, MLB‘s collective bargaining agreement, establish the MLB‘s
authority to punish misconduct.137 Under the Constitution, the MLB
Commissioner may punish players and other employees for conduct that
is not in the best interests of the League.138 The Basic Agreement creates

133
Robert Ambrose, Note, The NFL Makes It Rain: Through Strict Enforcement of Its Conduct
Policy, the NFL Protects Its Integrity, Wealth, and Popularity, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV 1069,
1080 (2008) (discussing the shaping of the MLB Commissioner‘s authority and the
appointment of Landis as the first commissioner); see also Major League Agreement, THE BIZ
OF BASEBALL (Aug. 30, 2006, 11:32), http://www.bizofbaseball.com/index.php?option=
com_content&view=article&id=58:1921-major-league-agreemen&catid=37:1900-1960&Item
id=47.
134
Ambrose, supra note 133, at 1080. ―In the early days of baseball, open gambling was
as common as a well-executed sacrifice bunt. Gamblers filled the stands and bet on
everything, including individual at bats.‖ Wayne S. Quirk, Baseball‘s Big Inning: The
Sacrifice of the 1919 Black Sox, in SPORTS AND THE LAW, MAJOR LEGAL CASES 111, 113 (Charles
E. Quirk ed., 1996); see also Pachman, supra note 78, at 1414 (discussing the Black Sox
scandal); Pollack, supra note 78, at 1650–58 (discussing the era of MLB leadership under
Landis).
135
See Judge Landis Bars ―Clean‖ Sox from Baseball Forever, N.Y. WORLD, Aug. 3, 1921, at 3
(explaining Commissioner Landis‘s decision to ban players that bet on the 1919 World
Series); The Chicago Black Sox Banned From Baseball, ESPN CLASSIC (Nov. 19, 2003),
http://espn.go.com/classic/s/black_sox_moments.html (detailing the timeline of the
scandal beginning from the initial allegations to the banishment of the players by the
commissioner).
136
Milwaukee Am. Ass‘n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 301 (N.D. Ill. 1931) (explaining that
while the commissioner was given broad authority, it was valid under the language agreed
upon in the Major League Agreement); see also Young Kim & Parlow, supra note 105, at
575–76 (discussing the development of the best interests authority in the MLB that
coincided with Landis‘s decision to banish the baseball players involved in the scandal).
137
Major League Constitution, supra note 89, at 2; MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 27.
138
Major League Constitution, supra note 89, at 2; see also Atlanta Nat‘l League Baseball
Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213 (1977) (upholding Kuhn‘s punishment of Ted Turner
for detrimental actions); Pachman, supra note 78, at 1417–20 (discussing the creation of the
MLA and the authority granted to its commissioner).
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the disciplinary structure and a grievance procedure.139 Article XII of the
Basic Agreement states that a player may be disciplined for just cause by
his team, the vice president of on-field operations, or the
commissioner.140 The just cause requirement in the Basic Agreement
mandates that player discipline be reasonably commensurate with the
conduct.141
Once a valid party disciplines a player, the player may utilize the
multi-step grievance procedure outlined in Article XI if he feels the
disciplinary decision was improper. 142 The grievance could ultimately
go to independent arbitration if the initial steps of the procedure do not
result in settlement.143 Procedural protections include requirements for
notice of the investigation and discipline of a player as well as full
discovery of all documents and evidence found in the investigation. 144
MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 27, at 32–45.
Id. at 43.
141
See id. (explaining that when a grievance is filed, the issue to be resolved is whether
there was just cause for the punishment); infra Part III.D (discussing the use of various
standards of review including just cause); see also In re Arbitration Between Major League
Baseball Players Ass‘n & Comm‘r of Major League Baseball (1992) (Nicolau, Arb.), reprinted
in 1 UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS & LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRY 541 (1992)
[hereinafter MLBPA v. Comm‘r] (explaining that the standard of review for the
commissioner‘s decision to ban Steve Howe from baseball was just cause); Pollack, supra
note 78, at 1693–94 (discussing an arbitrator‘s definition of just cause as a standard of
review for the punishment of baseball pitcher Steve Howe). There was no just cause for the
suspension of Steve Howe because the punishment was not ―reasonably commensurate
with the offense‖ or ―appropriate, given all the circumstances.‖ Pollack, supra note 78, at
1693–94. See generally Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of ―Just Cause‖
in Employee Discipline Cases, 1985 DUKE L.J. 594 (1985) (discussing the use of just cause as a
standard review for disciplinary decisions in other professional industries).
142
MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 27, at 43.
143
See id. at 38. The first step of the procedure involves the player discussing the matter
with a designated team representative. Id. at 36. If no settlement is reached, the player will
submit a written notice of grievance to that representative who will then render a decision.
Id. Secondly, a player may appeal the representative‘s decision to a designated
representative of the Major League Labor Relations Department (―LRD‖). Id. After
meeting to discuss the matter, the representative of the LRD will issue a decision. Id.
Appeal of that decision would go to arbitration. Id. at 37. The arbitration hearing will
involve one impartial arbitrator. Id. at 38. If the parties disagree on this point, there will be
a panel of three arbitrators: the impartial arbitrator plus an additional arbitrator chosen by
each side. Id. The full and final decision of the arbitrator or arbitration panel may affirm,
modify, or reverse the previous decision. Id. Arbitration hearings are conducted under the
Rules of Procedure listed in the Basic Agreement. Id.; see also id. at 226 (delineating the
Rules of Procedure used in Grievance Arbitration Hearings).
144
Id. at 44–45. A disciplined player and the MLBPA must receive written notice of the
discipline. Id. at 44. Reasonable advance notice of any investigatory interview is required.
Id. at 45. ―A [p]layer who is disciplined shall have the right to discover, in timely fashion,
all documents and evidence adduced during any investigation of the charges involved.‖
Id. at 44.
139
140
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The MLB Basic Agreement (―MLB CBA‖) employs one impartial
arbitrator or a panel of three arbitrators, two of whom are chosen by the
respective parties.145 If parties disagree on the arbitrator, the American
Arbitration Association provides a list from which parties can choose an
arbitrator.146
A player may not file a grievance, however, if it concerns an action
taken by the commissioner involving ―the preservation of the integrity
of, or the maintenance of public confidence in, the game of baseball.‖ 147
Furthermore, at any point during the process, the commissioner may
determine that the conduct in question involves the integrity of the game
and remove it from the grievance process. 148 If either situation arises, the
commissioner will issue a decision that constitutes ―full, final and
complete disposition of [the] complaint.‖ 149 Consequently, a MLB player
is not always assured an appeal; rather, it depends upon the section of
the Basic Agreement under which the punishment is levied.150
The 2005 suspension of Kenny Rogers by MLB Commissioner Bud
Selig demonstrates the importance of the distinction between an
Selig
appealable and a non-appealable disciplinary decision.151
suspended Rogers for twenty games and fined him $50,000 following an
altercation with a television cameraman. 152 Although Selig could have
punished Rogers for detrimental conduct under Article XI(A)(1)(b) so
that Rogers would have had no right to appeal, he issued the suspension

Id. at 35.
See id. (explaining that in the event of a disagreement, the AAA provides a list of
arbitrators from which each party will eliminate names until they come to an agreement on
one name to be the impartial arbitrator).
147
Id. at 32.
148
Id. at 33.
149
Id. The hearing in front of the commissioner follows the procedural rules set out in
Appendix A of the MLB CBA. Id. at 32.
150
See Marks, supra note 131, at 1619–21 (discussing Commissioner Bud Selig‘s decision
to suspend Kenny Rogers under Article XII of the MLB CBA, thereby preserving Rogers‘s
use of the grievance procedure); see also Major League Baseball Players Ass‘n v. Comm‘r of
Major League Baseball (John Rocker Arbitration Decision), in UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS
AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRY 2001, at 765 (PLI Intellectual Prop., Course
Handbook Series No. G-638, 2001) (stating that Commissioner Bud Selig‘s punishment of
pitcher John Rocker was excessive). Selig‘s suspension of Rocker under the MLB CBA
allowed Rocker to appeal to an independent arbitrator. Major League Baseball Players Ass‘n,
supra, at 769.
151
Selig Suspends Rogers for ‗Unprofessional‘ Act, NBC SPORTS (July 2, 2005, 7:11 p.m.),
http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/8409624/.
152
Id. Rogers pushed two cameramen to the ground causing minor physical injury to
one. Id. Rogers also threw one camera to the ground while the cameramen were
attempting to film Rogers walking from the dugout to the field prior to a home game. Id.
145
146
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and fine under Article XII of the Basic Agreement instead.153 As a result,
Rogers retained the right to appeal Selig‘s decision, which he did by
filing a grievance that went to arbitration.154 The arbitrator determined
that Selig‘s punishment was excessive and reduced the suspension to
thirteen games.155
Thus, an arbitrator may limit the MLB
Commissioner‘s disciplinary authority, similar to the practice in the
NBA.156
3.

Disciplinary Procedures in the National Basketball Association

The NBA Uniform Player Contract (―NBA UPC‖) details the level of
conduct that players must uphold.157 Section 5 requires a player to
refrain from doing ―anything that is materially detrimental or materially
prejudicial to the best interests of the Team or the League.‖ 158 Finally,
the NBA UPC requires players to adhere to Article 35 of the NBA
Constitution, which provides a more detailed listing of conduct expected
of an NBA player.159 If a player makes or endorses any statement or acts
in a way that is detrimental to the best interests of the NBA, he may be
Marks, supra note 131, at 1619; see also MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 27, at 32
(stating that an action which was taken ―by the [c]ommissioner involving the preservation
of the integrity of . . . the game of baseball‖ cannot give rise to the use of the grievance
procedure in Article XI).
154
MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 27, at 43. Article XII of the MLB CBA allows the
commissioner to discipline a player for just cause and provides the Grievance Procedure
through which players can seek review of the reasonableness of such discipline. Id. at 43–
45; Rogers Loses Appeal in Altercation with Cameraman, ESPN (July 28, 2005),
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2117962; see also Marks, supra note 131, at
1620 (discussing the suspension of Rogers under a section that allowed for independent
review).
155
Tim Brown, Rogers‘ Suspension Is Shortened, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2005),
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/aug/10/sports/sp-basenotes10.
The arbitrator also
ordered any fines to be paid to charity and held that the detrimental effect of the
suspension on incentives clauses in Rogers‘ contract was excessive. Id.; Jack Curry,
Palmeiro and Rogers Making Back-to-Back Returns, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2005,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9504E5DD143EF933A2575BC0A9639C8
B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all.
156
See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing arbitrators‘ decisions in cases involving NBA
commissioner discipline).
157
National Basketball Association Uniform Player Contract, NBA PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, A-2
to A-3, http://www.nbpa.org/sites/default/files/EXHIBIT%20A.pdf (last visited Aug. 17,
2010) [hereinafter NBA Contract].
158
Id. at A-2. Conduct must be at the level of ―the highest standards of honesty,
citizenship, and sportsmanship.‖ Id. The Commissioner‘s disciplinary decision under this
section is ―final, binding, conclusive, and unappealable.‖ Id. at A-3.
159
Id.; see also Misconduct, supra note 89 (explaining that misconduct involves actions in
violation of the best interests of the game, actions that are illegal, gambling on any game,
and tampering with a player or coach already under contract). Conduct must ―conform to
standards of morality or fair play.‖ Id. at art. 35(e).
153
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subject to a commissioner-imposed fine or suspension.160 Furthermore,
conduct that ―does not conform to standards of morality or fair play, that
does not comply at all times with all federal, state, and local laws‖ can
result in a suspension.161
All disciplinary decisions of the commissioner are subject to review
by the Board of Governors and are then appealable under the grievance
and arbitration procedure of the NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement
(―NBA CBA‖).162 A formal grievance must state the issues and must be
filed within a certain time limit.163 Both parties agree on a grievance
arbitrator and retain the ability to discharge that arbitrator. 164 Discovery

Misconduct, supra note 89, at A-14.
Id.; see also Mike Wise, Image-Conscious N.B.A. Suspends Iverson and Rider, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/04/sports/pro-basketball-imageconscious-nba-suspends-iverson-and-rider.html (discussing NBA Commissioner David
Stern‘s decision to suspend Allen Iverson and Isaiah Rider following separate criminal
charges). Stern suspended Iverson for one game after he pled no-contest to charges
stemming from weapons and drug possession charges. Wise, supra. Stern suspended
Rider for two games following a no-contest plea to illegal possession of cell phones and a
conviction for possession of marijuana. Id. Stern cited Article 35 of the NBA Constitution
in imposing the suspensions. Id. In discussing the importance of players‘ character and a
positive league image, Stern stated that ―criminal conduct is not part of acceptable life in
the N.B.A.‖ Id.
162
Misconduct, supra note 89, at A-15; Grievance and Arbitration Procedure and Special
Procedures with Respect to Disputes Involving Player Discipline, NAT‘L BASKETBALL PLAYERS
ASS‘N,
326–42,
http://www.nbpa.org/sites/default/files/ARTICLE%20XXXI.pdf
[hereinafter Grievance/Arbitration Procedure]. A player must discuss his complaint with the
adverse party before filing a formal grievance. Grievance/Arbitration Procedure, supra, at 327;
see also Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n v. Nat‘l Basketball Players Ass‘n, No. 04 Civ. 9528(GBD),
2005 WL 22869 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2005) (discussing the case in which a grievance arbitrator
reduced Jermaine O‘Neal‘s twenty-five game suspension for an altercation with fans
during an NBA game to fifteen games because it was without just cause). Nat‘l Basketball
Ass‘n, 2005 WL 22869, at *1. A federal district court held that the suspension was arbitrable
and upheld the arbitrator‘s reduction of the suspension. Id. at *10; see also In re Nat‘l
Basketball Players Ass‘n ex rel Player Latrell Sprewell & Warriors Basketball Club & Nat‘l
Basketball Ass‘n, 591 PLI/Pat (Pub. L. Inst.) 469 (2000) (Feerick, Arb.) [hereinafter In re
Sprewell] (discussing how Latrell Sprewell, who was suspended from the NBA for one
year in 1997 after he attacked and choked his head coach during practice, successfully
appealed his suspension to a grievance arbitrator). The arbitrator reduced the suspension
because he found that the commissioner‘s decision was not in the interest of ―justice and
fairness.‖ In re Sprewell 591 PLI/Pat at 573.
163
Grievance/Arbitration Procedure, supra note 162, at 330–31.
164
Id. at 333. In the event disagreement persists, outside help is obtained from the
Conflict Prevention & Resolution Institute. Id. Recognizing the importance of impartiality,
none of the possible arbitrators have any recent business affiliation or relationship with
professional athletes or leagues. Id.
160
161
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of non-privileged documents is available to each party.165 The grievance
arbitrator will hear the dispute and issue an award.166
Despite successful player appeals, the NBA CBA, like the MLB
governing documents, maintains a provision that removes the review of
the disciplinary decisions from an arbitrator and gives final disposition
to the commissioner or his designee.167 If the commissioner‘s decision
concerns the integrity of the game and results in a financial impact of
$50,000 or less, any appeal must be made to the commissioner. 168
However, if the financial impact of the discipline is greater than $50,000,
the player may bring an appeal before the grievance arbitrator who will
apply an ―arbitrary and capricious‖ standard of review to the
commissioner‘s decision.169
The NBA‘s policy, as well as the MLB‘s, reflects a pro-arbitration
stance lacking in the NFL: both leagues‘ commissioners maintain broad
disciplinary authority, including best interests authority, which an
independent voice can review.170
Incorporation of independent
arbitration by the NBA and the MLB in its grievance procedures is
representative of the development of and support for arbitration found
Id. at 330–31.
Id. at 331–32. The arbitrator is chosen by both sides for the duration of the collective
bargaining agreement. Id. at 333. In the event that both parties cannot agree on an
arbitrator, the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (―the CPR
Institute‖) will provide a list of eleven attorneys from which the parties will choose an
arbitrator. Id. at 333–34. Questions of substantive arbitrability will be determined in a
judicial proceeding in federal court in the Southern District of New York. Id. at 332; see also
Berger, Arbitrability, supra note 33, at 787 (discussing the distinction between substantive
arbitrability and procedural arbitrability).
167
Grievance/Arbitration Procedure, supra note 162, at 335; see also cases cited supra note 162
(discussing cases in which NBA players successfully appealed a commissioner‘s
disciplinary decision).
168
Grievance/Arbitration Procedure, supra note 162, at 335.
169
Id. at 336; see also In re Sprewell, supra note 162 (discussing Latrell Sprewell‘s appeal of
his suspension for attacking his coach). A ruling is not arbitrary and capricious if there was
―a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.‖ Friends of Yosemite
Valley v. Kempthorne, 520 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2008).
170
Compare Grievance/Arbitration Procedure, supra note 162, at 336 (allowing an NBA
player to appeal a commissioner‘s suspension or fine for conduct detrimental to the NBA to
an independent arbitrator if the punishment is of sufficient magnitude), and MLB Basic
Agreement, supra note 27, at 43 (stating that an MLB player can use the grievance procedure
to determine if the commissioner had just cause for a disciplinary decision), and supra text
accompanying note 153–54 (explaining that MLB Commissioner Selig suspended Kenny
Rogers so that he maintained a right to an appellate hearing with an independent
arbitrator), with Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 2, at 3 (stating that a NFL player‘s only
appellate right is for a hearing conducted by the commissioner or his designee). The NFL
Personal Conduct Policy refers to the procedure in Article XI of the NFL CBA, which
directs all appeals to the commissioner or his designee. Commissioner Discipline, supra note
9, at 34.
165
166
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in courts and from legislators. 171 The unilateral implementation of the
NFL Personal Conduct Policy, absent procedural safeguards and an
independent process, has resulted in the possible violation of arbitration
principles as well as players with nominal appeal rights and a
commissioner with excessive authority.
III. ANALYSIS
The disciplinary structure of the NFL, defined most recently by the
Personal Conduct Policy, precludes an outside body from reviewing the
commissioner‘s punishment of players for off-field misconduct.172
Although the NFL Commissioner‘s authority to decide what is
detrimental to the best interests of the League is similar to the power of
commissioners in other leagues, the procedural safeguards are less
defined.173 Instead of independent arbitration, decisions under the
Policy are reviewed only by what may be a biased voice. 174
Courts and legislatures have created a policy to support arbitration
clauses.175 Additionally, courts have utilized the arbitration process to
promote efficiency, impartiality, and the rights of all parties. 176 The
protections inherent in the arbitration process are absent from the
method of discipline for off-field misconduct utilized by the NFL, whose
policy contains features that may be impermissible under the FAA or the
NLRA.177
Part III.A of this Note evaluates the NFL commissioner‘s role as the
arbiter of disputes under arbitration law with a specific look at the
question of impartiality.178 Part III.B examines the implementation of the

See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the increase in popularity of the use of arbitration in
labor disputes).
172
See Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 2, at 2 (explaining the NFL Commissioner‘s
authority to discipline and preside over appellate hearings); supra Part II.B.1.c (discussing
the grievance procedures available to NFL players).
173
See infra Part III.E (detailing the similarities and differences among league operating
agreements).
174
See infra Part III.A (discussing the role of the commissioner in hearing disputes under
the rules of the FAA).
175
See supra Part II.A (discussing the development of arbitration in the courts and
legislatures).
176
See Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d
132, 137 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that partiality prevents a person from acting as an arbitrator
when a material relationship with an arguing party is established); supra Part II.A.2
(discussing the arbitration principles gleaned from court holdings).
177
See infra Part III.A–B (discussing the NFL Commissioner as arbiter of his rulings and
outlining the implementation of the Conduct Policy).
178
See infra Part III.A (analyzing the NFL commissioner as a final arbiter under
arbitration laws).
171
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Personal Conduct Policy as a unilaterally employed working
condition.179 Next, Part III.C analyzes the scope of authority vested in a
commissioner to discipline for detrimental conduct not in the ―best
interests‖ of the league.180 Part III.D explores the various standards of
review that leagues have used in analyzing disciplinary decisions. 181
Finally, Part III.E compares the procedural safeguards in the NFL, NBA,
and MLB‘s operating agreements.182
A. Analyzing the Commissioner‘s Role as Final Arbiter Under Current
Arbitration Laws
One of the greatest concerns about the current disciplinary structure
in the NFL is whether the commissioner is able to maintain the desired
impartiality as the final authority in the appeals process. 183 The NFL
CBA gives the commissioner the power not only to discipline the players
but also to give the ―full, final and complete disposition‖ of any
appeal.184 In addition, he maintains a close working relationship with
both the owners and the NFL Management Council.185 Management
even chooses and provides compensation for the commissioner. 186 Thus,
there is a clear material relationship between the final arbiter, in this case
the NFL commissioner, and a party that results in evident partiality in
the resolution of a player‘s grievance. The player suffers because the

See infra Part III.B (discussing the possibly improper implementation of the Personal
Conduct Policy).
180
See infra Part III.C (examining the ―best interests‖ authority vested in the
commissioner).
181
See infra Part III.D (discussing standards of review used in professional sports
leagues).
182
See infra Part III.E (discussing the procedural safeguards in professional sports
leagues‘ governing documents).
183
See Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 12, 16 n.3 (8th Cir. 1974)
(explaining that the NFL governing documents put the commissioner in the role of
arbitrator that requires impartiality). The court reasoned that ―when he acts in the capacity
of an arbiter, he must act in an impartial manner within the authority given to him by the
[CBA], and that he must decide matters presented to him on the basis of the evidence
submitted by the parties.‖ Id.
184
Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 34. The final appeal may also be heard by a
commissioner designee. Id.; see also supra Part II.B.1 (explaining the commissioner‘s
decisions under the NFL governing documents).
185
See supra Part II.B.1.d (discussing the interaction between the commissioner, the
owners, and the NFL Management Council in the implementation of the conduct policy);
see also supra note 109 (explaining the relationship between the NFLMC and NFL owners).
186
NFL Constitution, supra note 89, at 28.
179
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NFL commissioner, also influenced by management, plays the role of
both prosecutor and judge.187
The FAA clearly states that a court may overturn an arbitration
award when there is evidence that an arbitrator has been biased in his
judgment.188 Impartiality is difficult to maintain because a commissioner
responsible for an entire league will do what is in the best interest of the
league and disregard the interests of the individual players. 189 This
could result in the commissioner‘s tendency to be biased and adversarial
to those players he disciplines. 190 The fact that the commissioner, who
creates, enforces, and interprets the rules, is not a disinterested party
violates the standards of the arbitration process. 191
The NFL Player Contract mentions the American Arbitration
Association (―AAA‖), which requires impartiality by all arbitrators.192
The AAA labor arbitration rules explain that an arbitrator is not neutral
if that person ―has any financial or personal interest in the result of the
arbitration.‖193 If this language were applied to the NFL, there could be

187
See supra Part II.B.1.c (explaining that when the commissioner disciplines a player and
the player appeals the commissioner‘s decision, the commissioner presides as the
arbitrator).
188
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2006). A court may vacate an arbitration award ―where there was
evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.‖ Id.
189
See Shaun Payne, Hugh Fullerton and the Press‘s Revealing Coverage of the Black Sox
Scandal, 1919–1921, HISTORIC BASEBALL, http://www.historicbaseball.com/scplayers/
jacksonmedia.html (explaining the decision by Commissioner Kenesaw Landis to ban the
players that allegedly bet on the 1919 World Series). Landis, the first commissioner of
Major League Baseball, explained his decision to banish all of the Chicago Black Sox
players who were found not guilty of throwing the 1919 World Series, by stating the
following: ―Just keep in mind that regardless of the verdict of juries, baseball is entirely
competent to protect itself against the crooks, both inside and outside the game.‖ Id.
190
See also Commonwealth Coating Corp. v. Cont‘l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 148–49 (1968)
(explaining that when the relationship between the arbitrator and a party includes a history
of minimal business transactions, there is significant evidence of partiality); Applied Indus.
Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2007)
(holding that a material relationship shows evident partiality precluding a person from
arbitrating a dispute). But see Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n v. Nat‘l Football League,
654 F. Supp.2d 960, 963–64 (D. Minn. 2009) aff‘d by Williams v. Nat‘l Football League, 582
F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2009) (explaining that foreseeable partiality that was collectively
bargained for does not violate the requirement of impartiality).
191
See Applied Indus. Materials Corp., 492 F.3d at 137 (defining a material relationship that
constitutes evident partiality); supra Part II.B.1.b (discussing the NFL commissioner‘s
various roles in the disciplinary structure).
192
Labor Arbitration Rules, supra note 79, §§ 5, 11. ―The AAA shall establish and maintain
a Panel of Neutral Labor Arbitrators and shall appoint arbitrators there from as hereinafter
provided.‖ Id. § 5.
193
Id. § 17.
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grounds for removal of the commissioner as arbiter. 194
The
commissioner is essentially a representative of the league management
that hired him and pays his compensation, thus creating a financial
conflict.195 Furthermore, a personal conflict could exist because the
commissioner must review the validity of his own decision. 196 Despite
the conflict, the NFLPA cannot find relief in the AAA labor arbitration
rules because the NFL CBA‘s injury grievance procedure supersedes the
arbitration rules in the Player Contract. 197
When a group of NFL players had their suspensions for violations of
the drug policy upheld, they filed a claim against the NFL and its chief
legal officer (―CLO‖), who presided as the final arbiter of the dispute,
arguing that the CLO had extended legal advice to parties involved. 198
In NFLPA v. NFL, the court examined the claim of bias and found that
there had been no bias beyond the foreseeable partiality. 199 The NFLPA
had ―agreed to a certain amount of partiality in the arbitrator‖ when it
negotiated the CBA that made the commissioner or one of his officers the
final arbiter.200 Thus, the commissioner is recognized as partial in his
role as an arbiter under the CBA.201 The Personal Conduct Policy that
refers to the procedures of the CBA, however, was not negotiated by the
NFLPA, making the resulting partiality improper.202

See NFL Constitution, supra note 89, at 28 (explaining that the commissioner, who
serves as an arbitrator, is elected by and is compensated by members of league
management).
195
See supra text accompanying note 186 (explaining that the commissioner is hired and
paid by the NFL). But see Labor Arbitration Rules, supra note 79, §§ 13–14 (discussing the
process by which both parties to an arbitration agreement take part in choosing the
arbitrators).
196
See Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 34 (making the commissioner the final
authority for disputes).
197
See NFL Player Contract, supra note 94, at 254 (recognizing that the NFL CBA
supersedes AAA procedures).
198
Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n v. Nat‘l Football League, 654 F. Supp. 2d 960, 963–
64 (D. Minn. 2009) aff‘d by Williams v. Nat‘l Football League, 582 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2009). In
Williams, Kevin Williams, Pat Williams, Charles Grant, Deuce McAllister, and Will Smith
tested positive for a banned substance in violation of the NFL‘s Policy on Anabolic Steroids
and Related Substances. Id. at 963. The players appealed their resulting suspensions to the
Commissioner who designated Chief Legal Officer, Jeffrey Pash, as the Hearing Officer. Id.
Pash upheld the suspensions and the players appealed to the courts. Id. at 964–65.
199
Id. at 969.
200
Id. at 968.
201
See id. (discussing the inherent partiality of the commissioner under the NFL CBA).
202
Compare Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 34 (discussing a negotiated aspect of
the NFL CBA that makes the commissioner an arbitrator of disputes), with supra text
accompanying note 26 (stating that the Personal Conduct Policy, which requires the use of
Article XI of the NFL CBA, was not collectively bargained).
194
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Although the commissioner‘s role as final arbiter may exceed the
scope of the FAA, AAA, and current court rulings, the federal policy
against partiality is still apparent.203 It is clear that impartiality is
essential to arbitration, the process that preserves the appeal rights of
League players.204 There may have been acceptance of the partiality by
the NFLPA, but the NFLPA did not accept the terms of the Personal
Conduct Policy, which utilizes the CBA‘s appeals process, through
negotiation with the NFL.205
B. Personal Conduct Policy as a Working Condition
The Personal Conduct Policy was established without negotiation
between the NFL and the NFLPA. 206 The commissioner‘s method of
promulgating this policy raises the question of whether the Conduct
Policy affects the players‘ employment conditions. 207 Under the NLRA, a
commissioner or the owners may not make unilateral changes that
would affect the working conditions negotiated under the CBA. 208
Furthermore, a commissioner cannot enforce a rule or disciplinary
sanction that contravenes the terms of the CBA.209 The NFL supported
these principles when former commissioner Pete Rozelle attempted to

See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the scope of arbitration agreements under the FAA
and the AAA).
204
See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the importance of impartiality according to statutory
and judicial principles).
205
See supra note 26 (explaining how the Conduct Policy was implemented with only
mere acquiescence from the NFLPA).
206
See supra Part II.B.1.d (discussing the implementation of the Personal Conduct Policy).
207
See Marks, supra note 131, at 1593–98 (discussing the Personal Conduct Policy as a
possible violation of the NLRA and how a court may rule on such a claim).
208
See Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 12, 17 (8th Cir. 1974)
(holding that the commissioner violated the National Labor Relations Act ―by unilaterally
promulgating and implementing a rule‖ that would institute an automatic fine for any
player that left the bench during a fight or altercation on the field); Pollack, supra note 78, at
1709 (discussing the Conduct Policy as a working condition); see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)
(2006) (explaining that an employer commits an unfair labor practice when he refuses to
bargain collectively).
209
See Atlanta Nat‘l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1219–20 (1977)
(recognizing that a commissioner‘s authority to hand down disciplinary action is framed
by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement). If the commissioner exercises
punitive authority outside the scope of the agreement, the commissioner breaches that
agreement. Id. at 1226. In Atlanta National League Baseball Club, the MLB Commissioner
fined the Atlanta Braves and denied the team a draft choice after its owner, Ted Turner,
committed a tampering violation by contacting Gary Matthews, a non-free agent. Id. at
1216–17. Turner and the Braves filed suit and the court held that the sanction imposed by
the Commissioner depriving the Braves of a draft pick was ultra vires and void. Id. at 1226.
203
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implement a new rule regarding in-game fights that was alleged to be a
unilateral change to players‘ working conditions. 210
Rozelle put into action a rule that would fine players $200 for leaving
the bench area during a fight.211 The NFLPA filed a complaint with the
National Labor Relations Board, alleging that the League had violated
the NLRA by unilaterally adopting the rule, a process that constituted a
refusal to bargain.212 The Eighth Circuit ultimately held that the owners,
not the commissioner, had unilaterally promulgated the rule, violating
the principles of the NLRA.213 However, if the commissioner played the
principal role in implementing the rule, it would be improper and
unethical for him not to include both the owners and the NFLPA in the
discussion.214 Although Rozelle had the authority to fine players for
conduct detrimental to the league, he did not have the authority to create

See Nat‘l Football League Mgmt. Council & Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n, 203
N.L.R.B. 958, 969 (1973) [hereinafter NFLMC v. NFLPA] (explaining that a unilateral change
in a working condition is an unfair labor practice that violates the collective bargaining
agreement); Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n & Nat‘l Football League Mgmt. Council &
Nat‘l Football League (Oct. 25, 1986) (Kasher, Arb.), cited in Ethan Lock, The Legality Under
the National Labor Relations Act of Attempts By National Football League Owners to Unilaterally
Implement Drug Testing Programs, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 15 (1987) (explaining that imposing a
drug testing program would be a change in the conditions of employment that was not
collectively bargained).
211
Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n v. NLRB, 503 F.2d at 13.
212
Id. at 14; NFLMC v. NFLPA, 203 N.L.R.B. at 958. The Board held that Commissioner
Rozelle had promulgated the rule, and that the owners did not commit any unfair labor
practices because they merely approved Rozelle‘s implementation of the rule. NFLMC v.
NFLPA, 203 N.L.R.B. at 959. It further held that the NFLPA had conceded that ―the
Commissioner has, and always has had, the authority to impose fines for conduct
detrimental to football with or without the approval of the owners.‖ Id. The Board viewed
Rozelle, who realized the need for the rule, as the catalyst for its creation. Id. Rozelle felt
that the rule may affect the competitive aspects of the game and so he referred it to the
owners and competition committee. Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (stating that it is an
unfair labor practice for an employer as a party to a labor agreement ―to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees‖). Interfering with or prohibiting an
employee subject to a CBA from engaging in collective bargaining or other negotiating
activities is also an unfair labor practice. § 158(a)(1); see also supra Part II.B.1.a (describing
the authority given to the commissioner to fine players for detrimental conduct).
213
Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n v. NLRB, 503 F.2d at 17. The court looked at whether
the Board erred in finding that the commissioner had adopted and promulgated the rule.
Id. at 13. Only after the owners had voted almost unanimously in favor of the rule did the
commissioner make the rule effective. Id. The court relied on the commissioner‘s
statement that the rule was created ―pursuant to a resolution passed by the member clubs.‖
Id. at 16.
214
See id. at 17 (explaining that as an agent of both the owners and the NFLPA, the
commissioner creates a ―serious breach of ethics‖ if he does not consult with both parties in
the promulgation of a rule).
210
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the rule.215 No matter the commissioner‘s role in the promulgation of a
rule, the governing documents of the NFL do not give the commissioner
the authority to make or change rules that affect the working conditions
of the players.216
Based on these holdings, the promulgation of the Personal Conduct
Policy could be seen as a violation of the NLRA if it is found to affect
working conditions.217 The Conduct Policy reduces player salaries
through fines and suspensions and restricts player movement, which
practically affects the working conditions of players.218 In fact, the
implementation of the Policy has resulted in greater fines and longer
suspensions.219 The practical effect of any employment rules on working
conditions makes them an issue subject to mandatory bargaining.220
Thus, the Conduct Policy‘s practical effect on player working conditions
suggests that the Policy must be negotiated.
The unilateral implementation of the bench-fine rule is similar to the
implementation of the Conduct Policy. Yet, when then-Commissioner
Tagliabue instituted the first conduct policy, he worked with the NFL
Management Council to implement the guidelines. 221 Commissioner
Goodell consulted with owners and the rest of the League even less than
Commissioner Tagliabue had before announcing the new Conduct

Id. at 15–16. There was no factual basis for the Board‘s assumption that the
commissioner created the rule because he had the authority to do so. Id. at 17.
216
See id. at 16 n.3 (―It seems clear . . . that whether the Commissioner is an agent of the
Employers, the joint agent of the Union and the Employers, or an independent third party,
he has no authority to make changes in practices which affect employment conditions of
the players.‖).
217
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (identifying ―wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment‖ as working conditions that may not be altered by the commissioner, but
must be collectively bargained); Mackey v. Nat‘l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir.
1976) (discussing what courts have defined as mandatory subjects of bargaining).
218
See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615 (holding that the Rozelle Rule was a mandatory subject of
bargaining under the NLRA); Nat‘l Football League Mgmt. Council & Nat‘l Football
League Players Ass‘n, 203 N.L.R.B. 958, 961–62 (1973) (explaining that fines reduce a
player‘s salary, a working condition, and are therefore a mandatory subject of bargaining);
see also supra note 23 (discussing when Commissioner Goodell has used his authority under
the Conduct Policy to suspend and fine players); supra note 52 (discussing the absence of
arms-length bargaining in the creation of the Rozelle Rule).
219
See Goodell Strengthens NFL Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 26 (discussing the
punishments of Adam Jones and Chris Henry as well as ―longer suspensions and larger
fines for individuals who violate the policy‖).
220
See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615 (―Whether an agreement concerns a mandatory subject
depends not on its form but on its practical effect.‖).
221
See Banks, supra note 120 (explaining that after two months of internal discussions
among members of the NFL Management Council, the NFL presented the new Conduct
Policy at the League meetings).
215
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Policy.222 Although it is unclear whether the owners or Goodell was the
catalyst behind the Policy, it is certain that Goodell unambiguously
desired its implemention.223 If that desire led to a determining role in the
promulgation of a rule affecting the working conditions of players, then
Goodell was assuming a duty that was not his, but was that of a labor
negotiator.224
If a claim is filed against Commissioner Goodell for unilaterally
promulgating a rule that alters the working conditions of the players, a
court may find sufficient grounds for an NLRA violation.225 On the other
hand, Goodell has consistently stated that any disciplinary action taken
under the Conduct Policy has resulted from conduct detrimental to the
NFL.226 Because the governing documents of the League definitively
vest in Goodell, as the NFL Commissioner, authority to discipline those
who harm the best interests of the league, the Policy could be a vehicle
through which Goodell is legitimately exercising that best interests
authority.227 Nevertheless, the implementation of the Policy was absent

See Goodell Strengthens NFL Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 26 (explaining that
while there were no official collective bargaining negotiations, Commissioner Goodell did
meet with NFLPA executive director Gene Upshaw prior to announcing the new Conduct
Policy).
223
See Battista, Problem Players, supra note 122 (discussing Commissioner Goodell‘s plans
for the new Conduct Policy as well as his intentions to meet with the owners prior to
unveiling the policy).
224
See Preamble, supra note 109, at 3 (discussing the formation of the NFL CBA through
negotiations between the NFL Management Council and the NFLPA). The Management
Council is ―the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of present and future
employer member Clubs of the National Football League.‖ Id.; see also Pollack, supra note
78, at 1711 (discussing the importance of the limited role of a commissioner in labor
negotiations, and, in particular, the preclusion of the NFL commissioner from labor
negotiations).
225
See generally Marks, supra note 131, at 1593–1601 (discussing whether the Conduct
Policy was unilaterally implemented and if the NFLPA would have any judicial recourse).
226
See Battista, Bans for Misconduct, supra note 123 (detailing Goodell‘s reasoning behind
the suspensions of Adam Jones and Chris Henry); Battista, Problem Players, supra note 122
(discussing the suspension of Adam Jones and Goodell‘s response that the misconduct
taints the reputation of the NFL); Goodell Strengthens NFL Personal Conduct Policy, supra note
26 (explaining that Goodell viewed the Conduct Policy as the next step in ensuring that
players continue to uphold the higher standard of responsible conduct to which all
members of the NFL are held). In a letter written to the suspended players, Goodell wrote
the following: ―Your conduct has brought embarrassment and ridicule upon yourself, your
club and the N.F.L., and has damaged the reputation of players throughout the
league . . . . You have engaged in conduct detrimental to the N.F.L. and failed to live up to
the standards expected of N.F.L. players.‖ Battista, Bans for Misconduct, supra note 123.
227
See Marks, supra note 131, at 1596 (stating that a valid reason for the Conduct Policy is
―to better the reputation and public opinion of the NFL and its players‖); supra Part II.B.1.d
(discussing behavior that is detrimental to the NFL and can result in discipline under the
authority given to the Commissioner by the Policy).
222
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any bona fide bargaining or quid pro quo for the NFLPA.228 The ―best
interests‖ authority of Goodell may preclude any such benefit, leaving
the players without practical appeal rights.
C. ―Best Interests‖ Authority in Professional Sports
The authority granted to the NFL commissioner to discipline for
conduct that is detrimental to, or not in the best interests of the League
and the sport itself is common among all governing documents in the
NFL.229 Commissioner Goodell, like past NFL commissioners, has used
this authority to justify his disciplinary decisions. 230 Still, it is not clear
what type of conduct is contrary to ―best interests.‖ 231 Other sports have
defined ―best interests‖ broadly and subjectively, giving great discretion
to the commissioner.232
See Mackey v. Nat‘l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 615–16 (8th Cir. 1976) (discussing
the absence of bona-fide bargaining and any benefit for the NFLPA in the promulgation of
the Rozelle Rule); supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of negotiation
that preceded the implementation of the Conduct Policy).
229
NFL Player Contract, supra note 94, at 253. The Player Contract reminds a player that
the success of the NFL depends on public respect for the league and that any conduct that
damages the integrity or public confidence in the game will be sanctioned upon the
reasonable judgment of the NFL Commissioner. Id.; NFL Constitution, supra note 89, at 29.
The Constitution gives the commissioner the following best interests authority:
The Commissioner is authorized . . . to hire legal counsel and take or
adopt appropriate legal action or such other steps or procedures as he
deems necessary and proper in the best interests of either the League
or professional football, whenever any party or organization not a
member of, employed by, or connected with the League or any
member thereof is guilty of any conduct detrimental either to the
League, its member clubs or employees, or to professional football.
NFL Constitution, supra note 89, at 29; see also supra Part II.B.1.c (discussing the authority to
discipline for detrimental conduct under the NFL CBA).
230
See Nat‘l Football League Mgmt. Council & Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n, 203
N.L.R.B. 958, 959 (1973) (discussing the concession that Commissioner Rozelle had the
authority to fine players for conduct detrimental to football in the context of the
promulgation of the Rozelle Rule); supra note 23 (discussing Goodell‘s use of the Conduct
Policy to discipline players for conduct that is damaging to the reputation of the NFL).
231
See Pachman, supra note 78, at 1411 (discussing the conduct that falls in the ―grayer
area‖ between definite detrimental conduct and conduct that does not offend the league‘s
best interests). Conduct in the gray area provokes the question of whether players should
subject themselves to the complete disciplinary authority of the commissioner and give up
personal rights in exchange for the privilege to play in the league. Id.
232
See Finley v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 534 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that the commissioner
was given the unambiguous authority to determine if any action is in the best interests of
the game); Atlanta Nat‘l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1222–26
(N.D. Ga. 1977) (explaining that it was within his authority under the Major League
Agreement for the MLB Commissioner to suspend the chief executive of the Atlanta
Braves, Ted Turner); Milwaukee Am. Ass‘n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 299 (N.D. Ill. 1931)
(holding that the agreement within the League created a commissioner‘s office with the
228
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The office of the MLB Commissioner was created in a way that gave
the holder of the position ―all the attributes of a benevolent but absolute
despot and all the disciplinary powers of the proverbial pater
familias.‖233 Attempts to curtail this authority have not succeeded
because courts recognized that the chartering language of the League
clearly showed that the parties intended the commissioner to wield
expansive authority to protect the best interests of the League.234 The
language in the operating agreement of the NFL regarding ―best
interests‖ authority is similar to that of the MLB agreements. 235 Both
leagues allow for the commissioner to supersede grievance procedures
when a grievance is filed in response to discipline for detrimental
conduct.236 In practice, however, the MLB Commissioner has refrained
from using that authority at times, allowing the players an independent
appeal.237 Furthermore, the NBA and the MLB do not have separate
player conduct policies similar to the NFL‘s, which more closely define
characteristics of ―a benevolent but absolute despot‖). But see Prof‘l Sports, Ltd. v. Va.
Squires Basketball Club, Ltd. P‘ship, 373 F. Supp. 946, 950 (W.D. Tex. 1974) (holding that
the commissioner was given authority to arbitrate disputes between clubs, but that there
was not the same authority to arbitrate commissioner-created disputes). For example, see
HOLTZMAN, supra note 147, at 186, which discusses former MLB Commissioner Bowie
Kuhn‘s assertion that the governing documents of the League did not establish an objective
standard in measuring ―best interests‖ authority.
233
Landis, 49 F.2d at 299; Major League Agreement, supra note 133, at art. I, § 2(a). The
Major League Agreement provides for the punishment of conduct that violates the ―best
interests‖ of the League. Major League Agreement, supra note 133, at art. I, § 2(a).
234
See Pachman, supra note 78, at 1420–29 (discussing the judicial review of commissioner
actions under the ―best interests‖ authority). The conflict between Pete Rose and MLB
Commissioner A. Bartlett Giamatti represents a recent example of the exercise of the "best
interests" clause. Id. Although it was resolved in a settlement prior to adjudication,
Giamatti‘s actions in investigating gambling allegations against Rose reinforced the wideranging use of the commissioner‘s disciplinary authority for the best interests of the game.
Id.
235
Compare Major League Agreement, supra note 133, at art. I, § 2(a) (explaining that the
commissioner has the authority to discipline any player, coach, or other league official for
conduct ―detrimental to the best interests of the national game of base ball‖), with
Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 34 (authorizing the commissioner to discipline for
―conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional
football‖).
236
MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 27, at 32–33 (giving the commissioner the authority to
hear all appeals of discipline resulting from conduct detrimental to the integrity of and
public confidence in the game); supra Part II.B.1.c (explaining that although the NFL CBA
does contain a section on a non-injury grievance procedure, it is superseded by the
commissioner‘s disciplinary authority under article XII).
237
See supra Part II.B.2 (explaining that Commissioner Bud Selig disciplined Kenny
Rogers in a way that allowed Rogers to appeal to an independent arbitrator under the
league grievance procedure); see also MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 27, at 128 (discussing
Commissioner Selig‘s reluctance to utilize his authority to prevent the use of the grievance
procedure when conduct was deemed detrimental to the game).
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detrimental conduct and reiterate the commissioner‘s authority in that
area.238
The expansive scope of the NFL commissioner‘s authority has been
questioned but courts have yet to expressly limit the breadth of his ―best
interests‖ authority.239 So long as a commissioner, with no standard for
review, acts within the scope of the authority granted to him under a
sport‘s operating agreement, courts have not overturned commissioner
decisions.240 This means Commissioner Goodell has a magnitude of
authority analogous to that given in theory to the commissioner of the
MLB; that is, the authority of a benevolent despot.241 To counter such
authority and partiality, the NFLPA must negotiate an independent
arbitration process in the new CBA that contains a defined standard of
review similar to one found in NBA or MLB procedures with which to
assess disciplinary decisions for off-field misconduct.
D. Standards of Review
Arbitrators in general evaluate the disciplinary decisions of
commissioners based on the guidelines provided in the operating
238
See Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 2, at 1 (requiring NFL players to refrain from
detrimental conduct); supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the NBA Commissioner‘s authority to
discipline for detrimental conduct).
239
See Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 12, 15–16 (8th Cir. 1974)
(acknowledging that the commissioner had the authority to fine players for conduct
detrimental to the NFL without directly holding the Rozelle Rule to be outside the scope of
that authority); Dryer v. L.A. Rams, 709 P.2d 826, 832–33 (Cal. 1985) (refraining from
limiting the best interests authority of the commissioner while holding that the case
involved a contract dispute and not a disciplinary decision so the commissioner could not
invoke his best interests power).
240
See Finley v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 539 (7th Cir. 1978) (explaining that MLB
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn‘s nullification of the sale of three players was upheld pursuant
to the authority granted by the League‘s operating agreement). The court stated that ―[t]he
Commissioner has been given broad power in unambiguous language to investigate any
act, transaction or practice not in the best interests of baseball, to determine what
preventive, remedial or punitive action is appropriate in the premises, and to take that
action.‖ Id. at 534. The court recognized that assessing the best interests of the game
required some expertise that the judiciary did not have. Id. at 537. The commissioner had
the requisite expertise; therefore, he was entrusted to discipline. Id. The court would not
decide if the commissioner‘s decision was right or wrong, only if it was within the
language of the agreement and not arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 539 n.44; see also Atlanta
Nat‘l League Baseball Club v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1222 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (recognizing
that a determination of what is in the best interests of baseball is not for courts to decide
and that the commissioner had the authority under the operating agreement to hand down
the punishment); Pollack, supra note 78, at 1679–85 (discussing the judicial deference shown
to the best interests authority in the case Finley v. Kuhn); supra text accompanying note 169
(discussing the appropriateness of the arbitrary or capricious standard in such cases).
241
See Landis, supra note 135 (discussing the court‘s holding that the commissioner was
given broad authority).
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agreements.242 If a commissioner‘s decision violates the standard of
review, the arbitrator will reduce or rescind the punishment. 243
Maintaining the fundamental fairness of a disciplinary decision,
analogous to principles of industrial due process, is important even
when ―best interests‖ and deterrence are the objectives.244
In the NFL operating agreement, a commissioner is instructed only
to use his ―best interests‖ discretion and discipline based on a series of
factors.245 In contrast, other professional sports leagues utilize standards
of review such as ―just cause‖ and ―arbitrary and capricious.‖ 246 The
NBA CBA provides for the use of the ―just cause‖ standard in grievance
procedures when punishments are not severe. 247 The MLB CBA requires
the grievance arbitrator to use the same ―just cause‖ standard of review,
reflecting the idea that the commissioner maintains a certain amount of
discretion and that the discipline should equal the offense. 248 In practice,
the standard of review has been successful in each league, both
upholding and shortening suspensions. 249
See supra Part II.B (discussing the standards of review that leagues incorporate into
their operating agreements).
243
See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the MLB arbitrator‘s reduction of the punishment of
Kenny Rogers).
244
See In re Nat‘l Basketball Players Ass‘n ex rel. Player Latrell Sprewell & Warriors
Basketball Club & Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n, 86 (2000) (Feerick, Arb.) (holding that fairness in
discipline is like standards of industrial due process); see also MLBPA v. Comm‘r, supra note
141 (explaining that principles of fairness should not be ignored in order to achieve
deterrence). See generally Raymond L. Hogler, Industrial Due Process and Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards, 31 LAB. L.J. 570 (1980) (discussing that within industrial due process, an
employee must be given the opportunity to present his or her side of a case before being
discharged by an employer).
245
See Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 2, at 2–3 (listing the factors the commissioner
should analyze disciplining first-time or repeat offenders). ―The specifics of the
disciplinary response will be based on the nature of the incident, the actual or threatened
risk to the participant and others, any prior or additional misconduct (whether or not
criminal charges were filed), and other relevant factors.‖ Id. at 2; see also supra Part III.C
(discussing the ―best interests‖ discretionary authority given to the NFL commissioner
under the League‘s operating agreements).
246
See Grievance/Arbitration Procedure, supra note 162, at 327 (stating when an arbitrary
and capricious standard should be used); supra note 141 (discussing the just cause standard
of review used by arbitrators in MLB disciplinary cases).
247
See supra text accompanying notes 167–69 (explaining how the severity of the
punishment by the commissioner may determine the appellate procedure available to the
player).
248
MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 27, at 43; see also MLBPA v. Comm‘r, supra note 141
(explaining that just cause standards include determining if the punishment was
appropriate considering the offense).
249
See Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n v. Nat‘l Basketball Players Ass‘n, No. 04-CV-9528(GBD),
2005 WL 22869 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2005) (holding that a suspension was without just cause);
Brown, supra note 155 (stating that an arbitrator found the suspension excessive under a
just cause standard); Peter Gammons, Suspended Romero ‗Didn‘t Cheat,‘ ESPN (Jan. 6, 2009,
242
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A commissioner must meet a high burden when justifying his
disciplinary decisions because his decision can hinder a player‘s
employment in that sport.250 That commissioner‘s decision, therefore,
must be strictly scrutinized so as to prevent a player‘s exclusion from
employment in an entire industry. 251 The NBA CBA does this by
requiring arbitrators to use an ―arbitrary and capricious‖ standard of
review in cases of more severe discipline.252 The NFL CBA, also able to
prevent employment in an entire industry, does not make an allowance
for more severe punishments.253 Recent punishments in the NFL that
restrict personal freedoms should require, at the very least, an applicable
standard of review like that in the NBA. 254
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Clymer, the court, presented with an
arbitration agreement that provided for the use of two different
standards of review, found the agreement ambiguous and construed it
against the party bringing the claim.255 The NFL CBA fails to define a
standard of review applicable for any level of commissioner discipline. 256
This language may be held ambiguous because it leaves the
commissioner with no guidance and only his own interpretation. 257
Under judicial holdings, a court may not overturn the commissioner‘s
interpretation as to the proper standard of review under the agreement
because of a difference in opinion. 258 Therefore, without a defined
1:36 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3812334 (reporting that J.C.
Romero‘s fifty-game suspension for steroid use was upheld in arbitration).
250
See MLBPA v. Comm‘r, supra note 141 (explaining that a commissioner in a
professional sports league has control over a player‘s employment that employers in other
industries do not have).
251
See id. (explaining why a commissioner in professional sports must justify disciplinary
decisions using a standard higher than in other industries).
252
Grievance/Arbitration Procedure, supra note 162, at 327.
253
See supra Part II.B.1 (explaining that the NFL CBA does not provide a defined
standard of review).
254
See Weistart, supra note 67, at 734 (explaining that the basic inquiry to be made
regarding a punishment is one of reasonableness). Although a professional sports league
should have the ability to punish players, rigid rules of personal conduct should be
balanced against personal freedoms to ensure reasonable punishment. Id. at 731–34; see also
NFL Aims to Tackle Public Relations Problem of Player Arrests!, supra note 122 (discussing the
punishment of Adam Jones that included a curfew and prevented Jones from going to
night clubs).
255
No. 93-0348, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12175, at *2, *7 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 1993).
256
See Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 34 (stating only that the commissioner or
his designee will preside at a hearing and issue a final written decision); supra Part II.B.1.c
(describing the NFL CBA‘s guidelines for the implementation of commissioner discipline).
257
See supra text accompanying note 60 (explaining that an arbitrator interprets an
arbitration agreement).
258
See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960); see
also United Paperworkers Int‘l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37–38 (1987) (holding that a
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standard like one found in the NBA or MLB, the NFL commissioner is
free to determine how to review appeals of imposed punishment. 259 The
absence of a defined standard, one of several differences among the NFL
appeals procedures and the NBA and MLB appeals procedures, reduces
the procedural protections for players.260
E. Comparison of the Appellate Procedures Among Professional Sports
Leagues
The NFL, NBA, and MLB each use different appeal procedures
depending on which governing document is used to discipline a
player.261 In the NBA and MLB, it is clear that when the commissioner
disciplines a player, that player may have his appeal heard by an
arbitrator under the grievance procedures. 262 In fact, the NBA recognizes
that independent arbitrators should handle the appeals of more severe
punishments.263 Conversely, a NFL player disciplined for off-field
conduct by the commissioner may only appeal to the commissioner. 264
The NFL does not even entertain the possibility of an alternative

court should not reject the factual findings or the interpretation of the contract by an
arbitrator even if it is based on a mistake of law); supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the holdings
that help define judicial review of arbitration awards).
259
See Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 2, at 2–3 (discussing only factors for initial
determination of a possible punishment). The Conduct Policy does not give an exact
standard of review and states that the commissioner has the ―authority to impose
discipline as warranted.‖ Id. at 2.
260
See Weistart, supra note 67, at 715 (discussing standards of proof in the context of
required procedural protections).
261
See supra Part II.B (discussing the disciplinary structure of each league under its
operating agreement).
262
See supra note 162 (discussing cases in which NBA players had punishments from the
commissioner reduced by an independent arbitrator through the grievance procedure in
the NBA CBA); supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the situation in which MLB Commissioner
Selig chose to discipline Kenny Rogers under a section of the MLB CBA that allowed
Rogers to appeal to an independent arbitrator); see also Grievance/Arbitration Procedure, supra
note 162, at 330 (explaining that the NBA‘s grievance procedures will follow the Labor
Arbitration Rules of the AAA).
263
See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (stating that where
the deprivation of fundamental rights and liberties are at stake, the procedural protection
provided should be ―appropriate to the nature of the case‖); supra text accompanying notes
167–69 (discussing the provision in the NBA CBA that requires appeals of punishments
resulting in a loss of more than $50,000 to be heard as provided by the grievance
procedure).
264
See supra Part II.B.1.c–d (explaining that under both the NFL CBA and the Personal
Conduct Policy, NFL players disciplined by the commissioner for detrimental off-field
conduct can only appeal the decision to the commissioner or his designee).
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grievance procedure in more severe cases despite several lengthy
suspensions that have prevented player employment. 265
In terms of discovery, courts have supported the specific FAA
guidelines that serve not only to clarify the process but also to assure
that each party can present an efficient appeal.266 The collective
bargaining agreements of the NBA and MLB contain specific guidelines
for discovery.267 Both describe which documents must be produced
upon request; the MLB CBA also details the arbitrator‘s role in deciding
the relevance of the evidence.268 The language of the CBAs would
eliminate the ambiguity that exists in the NFL CBA and is more akin to
the position of courts.269
The NFL CBA outlines the procedures for discipline, but the
processes for an appeal to the commissioner lack the definition needed to
meet a reasonableness standard.270 The NFL CBA lacks specificity in
regard to an appeal to the commissioner, stating that one may present
relevant evidence with no mention of discovery guidelines. 271 The
precedence of the commissioner‘s disciplinary authority and the severity
of the punishments warrant stronger procedural protections for
discovery.272
Furthermore, the method in the NFL for choosing the third-party
judge for the appeal of a commissioner‘s disciplinary decision is much
See Battista, Bans for Misconduct, supra note 123 (discussing the season-long suspension
of Adam Jones and the eight-game suspension of Chris Henry); supra Part II.B.1.d
(explaining that a hearing before the commissioner is the only appellate right available to
players that are disciplined under the Personal Conduct Policy).
266
See supra note 44 (discussing section 7 of the FAA and citing cases that develop the
discovery authority of an arbitrator before and during an arbitration proceeding).
267
See Grievance/Arbitration Procedure, supra note 162, at 330–31 (explaining that a party to
the arbitration has the right to discovery of all non-privileged documents from the
opposing party); MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 27, at 44 (stating that all documents from
an investigation are subject to the right of discovery).
268
See MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 27, at 227 (explaining that the lead arbitrator on
the arbitration panel is responsible for determining the relevancy and materiality of the
evidence presented).
269
See supra note 44 (discussing courts‘ holdings regarding discovery guidelines in
arbitration proceedings).
270
Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 34–35; Club Discipline, supra note 95, at 19–22;
see also Weistart, supra note 67 (discussing the reasonableness standard for required
procedural safeguards).
271
See Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 35 (stating that a party to the hearing may
―present, by testimony or otherwise, any evidence relevant to the hearing‖).
272
See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (explaining that a
more severe punishment requires stronger procedural protection); Commissioner Discipline,
supra note 9, at 35 (stating that the commissioner‘s disciplinary decisions supersede those of
the owners or teams); supra note 26 (discussing the increased severity of punishments that
Goodell has imposed).
265
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different than that in the other leagues.273 In the NFL, the commissioner
or a designee of the commissioner presides over the appellate hearing,
with the NFLPA consulting as to who will serve as the commissioner‘s
designee for the season.274 The NFL commissioner generally still
presides over the hearing and is responsible for final decisions in every
case, which abates the procedural safeguard provided by possibly
having a designee serve as the arbitrator to a dispute. 275 On the contrary,
the NBA and MLB name an independent arbitrator chosen through a
process that protects the rights of both parties, occasionally with
The NBA disqualifies
assistance from outside organizations. 276
arbitrators who have a previous business relationship with any
professional athletes or leagues.277 The NFL needs to recognize the
importance of the impartiality of a third-party arbitrator, just as the NBA
and MLB do. Subsequently, the NFL should amend the CBA so that it
contains an independent arbitration process that enhances the
procedural protections and appeal rights of players.
IV. CONTRIBUTION
The Personal Conduct Policy in the NFL vests the commissioner
with disciplinary authority that is too broad and limits the rights of
players to appeal.278 It does not contain reasonably defined procedures
or a standard of review.279 Instead, it calls for a partial commissioner not
273
Compare Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 34 (stating that either the
commissioner or the commissioner‘s designee will preside over appellate hearings), with
MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 27, at 35 (explaining the MLB procedure for selecting an
impartial arbitrator), and Grievance/Arbitration Procedure, supra note 162, at 333–34
(discussing the selection of an independent grievance arbitrator under the NBA CBA).
274
Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 34.
275
See id. (explaining that at the conclusion of an appellate hearing, the commissioner
issues a written decision that is the final and complete decision); supra Part II.B.1.c
(showing that the commissioner by and large presides over any appellate hearing for
discipline issued under the Personal Conduct Policy).
276
See MLB Basic Agreement, supra note 27, at 35 (discussing the procedure delineated in
the MLB CBA for choosing an independent arbitrator); Grievance/Arbitration Procedure,
supra note 162 (explaining the method for selecting an arbitrator under the NBA CBA);
supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the independent arbitration procedure in the MLB‘s
disciplinary structure); supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the independent arbitration procedure
in the NBA‘s disciplinary structure).
277
See Grievance/Arbitration Procedure, supra note 162, at 333–34 (stating that the NBA CBA
requires all potential arbitrators to be free of certain recent business relationships).
278
See supra Part III (analyzing the commissioner‘s disciplinary authority and the
implementation of the Personal Conduct Policy).
279
See supra Part III.E (comparing the procedural protections in the NFL disciplinary
structure with those found in the NBA and MLB); supra Part III.D (explaining that the
Policy fails to properly define an exact standard of review).
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only to impose punishments but also to review the validity of those
punishments.280 Finally, the Policy furthers the already expansive ―best
interests‖ authority and constitutes a working condition that was not
Consequently, this Note suggests
collectively bargained.281
incorporating into the new NFL CBA an amended Personal Conduct
Policy to both increase procedural protections and include an
independent arbitration procedure.
A. Incorporate the Personal Conduct Policy into the New NFL CBA
The first step in amending the CBA would be to create a new article
for the Personal Conduct Policy following Article XI, Commissioner
Discipline, in the CBA. The current Policy is a stricter version of a
previous conduct policy that was put in place to deter off-field
detrimental misconduct.282 It was written and put into action by
Commissioner Goodell with only the acquiescence of the NFLPA in
apparent violation of the NLRA.283 Goodell assumed a duty that was not
his and created rules that affect the working conditions of NFL players
without including the NFLPA in a collective bargaining discussion. 284
By incorporating the Conduct Policy into the CBA, there would no
longer be any question of violating standard labor and collective
bargaining practices because it would no longer be the result of
unilateral implementation. The NFLPA and League Management would
engage in the bona fide bargaining required when a working condition is
affected.285 At the very least, by having the chance to collectively bargain
for its incorporation and its terms, the NFLPA could receive a quid pro
quo for its acquiescence to the Policy. 286
Opponents may argue that the Policy was properly promulgated
because owners were involved in the creation of the first Conduct Policy
See supra Part III.A (discussing the requirements of impartiality in an appellate
procedure in the context of the commissioner‘s role as arbiter of disputes).
281
See supra Part III.C (discussing the best interests authority given to commissioners in
professional sports); supra Part III.B (discussing the unilateral implementation of the
Conduct Policy and whether it is a working condition promulgated absent collective
bargaining).
282
See supra Part II.B.1.d (discussing the creation of the original policy and the current
Conduct Policy).
283
See supra Part III.B (discussing how Commissioner Goodell was the driving force
behind the Conduct Policy); supra text accompanying note 26 (explaining that the Conduct
Policy was implemented without any negotiation).
284
See supra Part III.B (explaining that rules that affect working conditions are mandatory
subjects of bargaining).
285
See supra Part III.B (discussing required steps for the implementation of rules).
286
See Mackey v. Nat‘l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 616 (8th Cir. 1976) (discussing the
absent quid pro quo for the NFLPA in the promulgation of the Rozelle Rule).
280
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and, thus, there is no need to include the new Conduct Policy in the
CBA.287 Nevertheless, Commissioner Goodell‘s efforts created the
current Conduct Policy that punishes player conduct short of criminal
behavior.288 It even uses the grievance procedures of the CBA in a way
that was not contemplated in collective bargaining.289
B. Amend the Hearing Rights in the Personal Conduct Policy
The next step following the incorporation of the Personal Conduct
Policy must be to amend the language of the section entitled ―Hearing
Rights‖ to include a two-tiered procedure determined by the severity of
the disputed punishment imposed by the commissioner.290
The
procedure would utilize either the commissioner as the arbitrator or an
independent arbitration panel. The amended section appears as follows,
with the author‘s commentary intertwined.
Proposed Amendment to ―Hearing Rights‖ in Personal
Conduct Policy291
Persons filing an appeal shall be entitled to a prompt
hearing pursuant to the following procedure:
a) A dispute involving an action taken by the
Commissioner under this article (i) concerning
conduct detrimental to the integrity of and public
confidence in the NFL and (ii) resulting in a financial
impact of the equivalent of one (1) punished player‘s
game check or less shall be subject exclusively to a
hearing before the Commissioner or his designee
under the procedures set forth in Article XI. The
Commissioner will choose his designee with the
approval of the Executive Director of the NFLPA.
b) A dispute involving an action taken by the
Commissioner under this article (i) concerning
See supra text accompanying note 120 (discussing the creation of the Conduct Policy in
2000).
288
See Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 12, 17 (8th Cir. 1974)
(explaining that the commissioner should consult with both parties in the promulgation of
a rule); New Commish Goodell Gets Tough, supra note 123 (citing examples of how
Commissioner Goodell strengthened the player conduct policy).
289
See Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 2, at 3 (stating that hearings shall be held
―pursuant to Article XI of the Collective Bargaining Agreement‖).
290
Id.
291
The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contribution of the author. The
language in regular font is taken from the NFL Personal Conduct Policy. See generally
Personal Conduct Policy, supra note 2, at 3.
287
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conduct detrimental to the integrity of and public
confidence in the NFL and (ii) resulting in a financial
impact of more than the equivalent of one (1)
punished player‘s game check shall be subject
exclusively to a hearing before an arbitration panel
consisting of three (3) arbitrators under the
procedures set forth in Article IX §§ 2, 3, 5, and 8.
The arbitrators will be selected as follows:
A) One (1) arbitrator chosen by the
Commissioner from a list of arbitrators
provided by the American Arbitration
Association.
B) One (1) arbitrator chosen by the NFLPA
from a list of arbitrators provided by the
American Arbitration Association.
C) One (1) arbitrator chosen by the NFL
Management Council from a list of
arbitrators provided by the American
Arbitration Association.
D) None of the selected arbitrators shall violate
the neutrality and impartiality requirements
as listed in the American Arbitration
Association Labor Arbitration Rules.
Commentary
Amending the hearing rights section of the Conduct Policy with a
new two-tiered dispute resolution procedure will ensure impartiality,
limit the best interests authority of the commissioner, and protect
players‘ rights in cases involving severe punishments.292 Inserting the
appeal procedure directly into the Conduct Policy defines the process
better than simply referencing a process in another section of the CBA.
This will allow independent arbitrators to moderate discipline imposed
by a commissioner in a way analogous to the successful procedures in
the NBA and MLB.293
The new procedure prevents the evident partiality that resulted from
the commissioner arbitrating the validity of his own decisions. 294 In
most cases of discipline, it will eliminate two relationships that could

See supra Part III (analyzing the requirements of reasonable procedures and
impartiality as well as the best interests authority of the commissioner).
293
See supra Part II.B.2–3 (discussing the grievance procedures in the MLB and the NBA).
294
See supra Part III.A (discussing the commissioner‘s role in reviewing his disputes and
the standard of evident partiality).
292

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 1 [2010], Art. 11

408

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

compromise impartiality: a material relationship between the presiding
arbitrator and an involved party and a financial and representative
relationship between the commissioner and NFL management. 295
Furthermore, the addition of this appeal procedure will validate any
foreseeable partiality that exists when the commissioner presides over
disputes involving less severe punishments because it will now be the
result of collective bargaining.296
Section (b)(D), requiring the selected arbitrators to meet neutrality
requirements, further ensures the arbitration panel‘s impartiality. 297
Adherence to AAA Labor Arbitration Rules precludes any financial
relationship between the arbitrators and the parties.298 Furthermore,
sections (b)(A)–(C) prevent bias by allowing each party to the collective
bargaining agreement—the NFLPA, the NFL Management Council, and
the commissioner—to choose a member of the panel. 299
By limiting the discretion and the appellate purview of the
commissioner, the new procedure will diminish the problem of
unchecked ―best interests‖ authority.300 Instead, an independent panel
will determine whether the punishment, under the applicable standard
of review, is a valid exercise of the commissioner‘s authority.301
Moreover, stopping the commissioner from superseding the grievance
See Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d
132, 137 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that evident partiality exists when an arbitrator‘s
corporation has a financial relationship with an involved party‘s corporation); supra text
accompanying note 80 (explaining that a material relationship between the arbitrator and a
party is evidence of partiality); supra Part III.A (explaining that the commissioner is a party
to the dispute over which he presides and discussing the financial relationship between the
commissioner and management).
296
See Nat‘l Football League Players Ass‘n v. Nat‘l Football League, 654 F. Supp. 2d 960,
968 (D. Minn. 2009) aff‘d by Williams v. National Football League, 582 F.3d 863 (8th Cir.
2009) (explaining that the parties agreed to the foreseeable partiality when they collectively
bargained for the position).
297
This clause is similar in intent to Article XXXI § 6(b) of the NBA CBA. See
Grievance/Arbitration Procedure, supra note 162, at 333 (stating that selected grievance
arbitrators may not have professional relationships with professional athletes or leagues in
the preceding five years).
298
See Labor Arbitration Rules, supra note 79, §§ 5, 11 (discussing the neutrality
requirements of the AAA Labor arbitration rules). ―No person shall serve as a neutral
arbitrator in any arbitration . . . in which that person has any financial or personal interest
in the result of the arbitration.‖ Id. § 17.
299
See Preamble, supra note 109, at 3 (stating that the NFLPA represents the players and
that the NFL Management Council represents the league in the collective bargaining
process).
300
Courts will not overturn a commissioner‘s decisions that are justified by the best
interests authority in operating agreements. See supra Part III.C (discussing judicial
responses to best interests authority in the NFL and MLB).
301
See infra Part IV.C (defining the proposed standard of review to be amended to the
Policy).
295
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procedure guarantees that most of the commissioner‘s ―best interests‖
decisions will be reviewable.302
The current procedural protections and appeal rights of players do
not differ with the severity of the punishment.303 The two-tiered
approach would establish increased appeal rights when the imposed
punishment is more severe. Because the value of one game check is the
threshold, minimal punishment is still controlled by the commissioner.
More severe punishments should be subject to review by an independent
arbitration panel because the NFL commissioner can limit or prohibit a
As
player‘s employment in the entire industry of football. 304
punishments escalate in severity towards banishment, the need for
independent review and procedures increase. 305
C. Define Procedural Protections and Standards of Review
The final step will be to define the procedures of the appeal process
to satisfy a reasonableness standard and to implement a standard of
review for either the commissioner or the arbitration panel to follow.
The amendments proposed below provide specific guidelines for
discovery as well as a standard of review for either prevailing appeal
procedure. The amended sections appear with the author‘s commentary:
Proposed Amendment of ―Procedural Protections‖ to the
Personal Conduct Policy306
Discovery Guidelines
(a) Each party will submit to the other involved parties copies
of all non-privileged documents, reports, and records that
are relevant to the action giving rise to, the investigation
of, and the actual dispute.
(b) A party may call witnesses to testify to non-privileged
information relevant to the action giving rise to, the
investigation of, and the actual dispute.
(c) The person or panel presiding over the hearing shall
determine the relevance of documents and testimony
submitted under this section.

See supra text accompanying note 167 (explaining that professional leagues often
incorporate a clause that would allow the commissioner to remove a dispute from an
independent grievance procedure).
303
See supra Part III.E (analyzing the procedural protections of the NFL).
304
See supra Part II.B.1.a (discussing the NFL commissioner‘s authority to discipline).
305
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
306
The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contribution of the author.
302
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(d) Parties shall adhere to all other discovery guidelines
pursuant to Article IX § 5 that do not conflict with any of
the language in this Policy.
Commentary
The proposed section would expand on the current ―any evidence
relevant‖ explanation to provide clear instructions for discovery
resembling those in a judicial proceeding. 307 The present guidelines
simply are not adequate when the commissioner‘s disciplinary decisions
supersede all other discipline and can even include banishment.308 The
proposed guidelines will adhere to judicial holdings that provide for
defined discovery in arbitration cases. 309
Clauses (c) and (d) under the Discovery Guidelines will expedite any
extended discovery or disputes over discoverable evidence. Clause (c)
puts the arbitrator in the role of resolving relevance, preventing
discovery disputes from being part of the arbitration process. Clause (d)
preserves the existing non-conflicting provisions in the CBA because it
uses the reasonable time requirements for discovery.310 It also precludes
a party‘s use of evidence that was not submitted to the other party. 311
Each clause is necessary for an efficient discovery process.
Proposed Amendment of ―Standards of Review‖ to the
Personal Conduct Policy312
Standard of Review
(a) The party or arbitration panel presiding over a dispute
shall apply a ―just cause‖ standard of review in deciding
the propriety of the punishment.
(b) The party or arbitration panel applying the ―just cause‖
standard of review shall determine whether the magnitude
of punishment was commensurate with the conduct
giving rise to the punishment.

Commissioner Discipline, supra note 9, at 35.
See supra Part III.E (discussing the lack of reasonable discovery guidelines in the
Conduct Policy).
309
See supra note 44 (discussing the judicial intervention that has compelled discovery in
cases of arbitration).
310
See Non-Injury Grievance, supra note 111, at 24 (stating that all relevant documents
must be submitted no later than ten days prior to the hearing).
311
See id. (explaining when documents may or may not be used in an arbitration
proceeding if discovery deadlines are not met).
312
The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contribution of the author.
307
308
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Commentary
The implementation of a defined standard of review ensures
fundamental fairness in the punishment of players and is increasingly
important because the length and severity of punishments have
increased under the Policy.313 Instead of relying on an arbitrator‘s
discretion, there will be a defined guideline for choosing to modify or
overturn a punishment.314
The section will also provide the
commissioner a standard of reference in imposing discipline.
Just cause is the proper standard of review because it holds the
An arbitrary and
commissioner to a reasonableness standard.315
capricious standard, while successfully used in the NBA, is less clear and
that ambiguity would not substantially limit the commissioner‘s
authority to impose punishments.316 Just cause is a more precise
standard that will require the presiding arbitrator to evaluate the dispute
in the circumstances.317 The inclusion of sections (a) and (b) assures that
the arbitrator will properly assess both the imposition of discipline as
well as the magnitude of the punishment. Thus, this standard of review
will eradicate the ambiguity that can lead to judicial intervention in
arbitration proceedings.318
Following these steps to amend and incorporate the Personal
Conduct Policy will result in a disciplinary system that includes
reasonable procedural protections and an impartial arbitrator. It will
benefit players by increasing their appeal rights to a level better suited to
coexist with the authority of the commissioner to completely prohibit a
player‘s employment in an entire industry. 319 The main argument
against the proposed change to the Policy and the new CBA is that it
would revoke the singular authority of the commissioner to properly
punish, deter, and prevent detrimental and criminal conduct by NFL
players, an authority even more necessary in an image-conscious
313
See supra Part III.D (analyzing the role of standards of review in professional sports
coinciding with the increase in the severity of discipline).
314
See supra Part III.D (explaining that the present Conduct Policy only calls for the use of
the commissioner‘s discretion).
315
Reasonableness is also similar to the requirements for other procedural protections.
See supra text accompanying note 141 (explaining the just cause standard of review and
how it has been used in practice).
316
See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the use of the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review in the NBA).
317
See supra Part III.D (analyzing the use of the just cause standard).
318
See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Clymer, No. 93-0348, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12175, at *2, *7 (E.D.
Pa. July 1, 1993) (holding that the use of two different standards of review was ambiguous
and ordering a modification of the award).
319
See supra Part II.B.1.b–c (explaining that players may only appeal disputes to the
commissioner who has expansive authority to impose discipline).
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industry.320 However, the language that authorizes Commissioner
Goodell‘s disciplinary authority for certain conduct will not change nor
will the NFL‘s ability to protect its image. An arbitrator could just as
easily uphold a severe punishment for highly publicized misconduct as
it could overturn the punishment so long as there was just cause. The
change will eliminate Goodell‘s authority to enforce punishments
without proper procedure and just cause.
As a result of the
amendments, the Personal Conduct Policy will become a joint action to
deter detrimental and criminal conduct, collectively agreed by the
commissioner, NFL management, and the NFLPA.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the NFL‘s current Personal Conduct Policy, Commissioner
Roger Goodell has nearly unlimited authority to discipline players for
detrimental off-field conduct and then preside over disputes involving
those punishments. There is no standard of review, and procedural
protections for players are sparse. Further, the present Policy is not the
result of collective bargaining between the NFLPA and the NFL
Management Council. This is an apparent violation of NLRA standards
because Goodell implemented the Conduct Policy himself, which
affected player working conditions.
Amending the Conduct Policy to include an independent arbitration
procedure with a defined standard of review and discovery guidelines
would solve these problems. League management and the NFLPA
should incorporate the amended document into the new NFL CBA
through collective bargaining. Amending the new CBA would establish
a new impartial grievance procedure validated by bona fide bargaining.
The commissioner would maintain authority to discipline in the best
interests of the NFL, while players would receive a meaningful right of
appeal to an impartial arbitrator rather than the empty right to ask the
commissioner to reconsider the punishment he already granted.
Returning to Player A and the charitable organizations hypothetical
discussed in Part I, implementing the new Policy in the CBA would
provide a better opportunity to reduce what was an excessive
punishment. Because the suspension of six games would easily result in
a financial impact of greater than one game check, Player A could appeal
to an independent arbitration panel. 321 Further, he could call witnesses
See supra note 123 (discussing by comparison the increase in criminal conduct that
motivated Commissioner Goodell to implement the current Conduct Policy).
321
See supra Part IV.B (proposing under section (a)(ii) of the amendment that a dispute
over a punishment resulting in the financial impact of more than one game check will be
heard in front of an arbitration panel).
320
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and introduce documents from the criminal investigation to show the
arbitration panel that the punishment was improper under a ―just cause‖
standard of review. An arbitration panel most likely would find that the
punishment was not commensurate with the offense and significantly
reduce Player A‘s suspension.
The current NFL disciplinary structure for off-field player conduct
gives the NFL Commissioner discretion to make the rules, punish
misconduct, and review those punishments.
The source of this
authority, the Personal Conduct Policy, was not bargained for but affects
the working conditions of players as much as any other provision of the
NFL CBA that resulted from collective bargaining. The NFL and the
NFLPA must rectify the unilaterally promulgated Personal Conduct
Policy that makes the Commissioner an absolute despot with an
unchallenged authority to respond to the conduct of NFL players.
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